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I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, immigration has become an increasingly 
controversial political issue and the “Official-English” movement has 
gathered steam.  Many state and local governments have enacted 
Official-English laws or constitutional amendments, employers have 
promulgated English-only workplace policies, and the treatment of non-
native English speakers in the schools, the courts, and other aspects of 
public life has come under increasing public scrutiny.  Such initiatives 
have led to an increasing number of legal challenges and an increasing 
number of judicial decisions addressing the implications of Official-
English and English-only laws and policies.1  The student authors of this 
survey article therefore perform an important and useful service by 
reporting and describing Official-English and English-only laws and 
policies of various kinds, and gathering, organizing, and analyzing 
decisions that address these laws and policies in a variety of settings and 
under a variety of legal theories. 
We may think of these developments as recent phenomena fueled by 
modern conditions, but language issues are as old as the United States 
itself.2  Even before the Revolutionary War, for example, Benjamin 
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 1. Official-English and English-only policies often overlap, but they are not identical 
concepts.  An Official-English policy concerns the status of English as the official language of 
public documents and discourse, but making English the official language does not necessarily imply 
that other languages cannot also be used.  Conversely, while English-only policies prohibit the use of 
languages other than English, they may be adopted for reasons other than the “official” status of 
English and by private entities that have no authority to determine an official language. 
 2. See DENNIS BARON, THE ENGLISH-ONLY QUESTION: AN OFFICIAL LANGUAGE FOR 
AMERICANS? 42 (1990) (discussing the post-Revolutionary War debate over the “official language” 
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Franklin complained in a famous letter regarding German immigrants in 
Pennsylvania that “[f]ew of their children in the Country learn English” 
and that “legal Writings in their own Language . . . are allowed good in 
our Courts.”3  In 1780, John Adams proposed the establishment of a 
national language academy, which would have effectively created an 
official English for the United States, but the proposal garnered little 
support and died in Congress.4  This failure is generally understood as a 
reflection of the then popular view that a national language academy 
would be “monarchist” in character and “inconsistent with principles of 
individual liberty.”5  Thus, even at the founding, there was tension 
between “a tolerant, expansive view of liberty that includes recognition 
and respect for the cultural differences of Americans” and “a demand for 
uniformity and assimilation to some vision of American identity, 
assumed to be homogeneous.”6 
Efforts to make English the official language of the United States or 
to discourage immigrants from continuing to use their native tongue have 
appeared periodically throughout our history, typically coinciding with 
significant waves of immigration and anti-immigration sentiment.7  One 
well-known example arose around the time of World War I, when a 
wave of anti-German sentiment resulted in many state laws prohibiting 
the teaching of foreign languages.  In Meyer v. Nebraska,8 the Supreme 
Court held that a law banning the teaching of a language other than 
English before the eighth grade improperly interfered with the liberty of 
                                                                                                                       
of the United States). 
 3. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Peter Collinson (May 9, 1753), in LANGUAGE 
LOYALTIES: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH CONTROVERSY 18–19 (James Crawford 
ed., 1992). 
 4. Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural 
Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 295 (1992). 
 5. Id. at 297. 
 6. Id. at 275–76. 
 7. For a comprehensive historical discussion of the Official-English issue and English-only 
laws, see BARON, supra note 2, and Perea, supra note 4.  See also Donna F. Coltharp, Comment, 
Speaking the Language of Exclusion: How Equal Protection and Fundamental Rights Analyses 
Permit Language Discrimination, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 149, 158–64 (1996) (summarizing history); 
Carol Schmid, Comment, Language Rights and the Legal Status of English-Only Laws in the Public 
and Private Sector, 20 N.C. CENT. L.J. 65, 67–72 (1992) (same); Cecilia Wong, Note, Language is 
Speech: The Illegitimacy of Official English After Yniguez v. Arizonians for Official English, 30 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 280–85 (1996) (same).  Ironically, efforts to compel linguistic and cultural 
assimilation have not been limited to immigrants; forcing Native Americans to abandon their mother 
tongue and learn English was a prominent feature of United States Indian policy for some time. See 
generally Allison M. Dussias, Waging War with Words: Native Americans’ Continuing Struggle 
Against the Suppression of Their Languages, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 901, 905–28 (1999).  See also Allison 
M. Dussias, Indigenous Languages Under Siege: The Native American Experience, 3 
INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 5, 8–18 (2008). 
 8. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
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parents to determine the education of their children.9  The principal 
rationale of the case was that the state lacked the authority to interfere 
with this liberty because there was no valid state police power 
justification for the law, insofar as teaching foreign language was not in 
any way harmful to children.10  In the course of its opinion, however, the 
Court also pronounced broadly that “[t]he protection of the Constitution 
extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to those 
born with English on the tongue.”11  Later, in the famous “footnote 4” of 
United States v. Carolene Products, the Court characterized Meyer and 
similar cases as involving discrimination against “particular . . . 
national . . . minorities.”12 
As this discussion suggests, current efforts to make English the 
official language of the United States and to adopt English-only laws and 
policies have much in common with their historical predecessors.  Then, 
as now, the debate reflects a tension between demands for assimilation 
and respect for cultural differences.  Then, as now, proponents of 
Official-English laws emphasized the ways in which a common language 
unifies the population and defines the political community.13  Then, as 
now, language was central to individual identity and social belonging.  
Then, as now, the issues were tinged with racial, ethnic, and religious 
prejudices.  Thus, it is hardly surprising that then, as now, the issue was 
one that evoked strong, emotional responses. 
Although located at the geographic center of the country, Kansas is 
not immune from these forces and has a fascinating history of linguistic 
minorities.14  Many German speaking immigrants settled in Kansas 
during the nineteenth century, establishing communities in which 
                                                          
 9. Id. at 399–400. 
 10. Id. at 400. 
 11. Id. at 401. 
 12. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (citing Bartels v. Iowa, 
262 U.S. 404 (1923) (companion case to Meyer) and Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) 
(following Meyer)). 
 13. In Meyer, for example, the Court described the purposes of the law as follows: 
It is said the purpose of the legislation was to promote civic development by inhibiting 
training and education of the immature in foreign tongues and ideals before they could 
learn English and acquire American ideals, and “that the English language should be and 
become the mother tongue of all children reared in this state.”  It is also affirmed that the 
foreign born population is very large, that certain communities commonly use foreign 
words, follow foreign leaders, move in a foreign atmosphere, and that the children are 
thereby hindered from becoming citizens of the most useful type and the public safety is 
imperiled. 
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401. 
 14. See J. NEALE CARMAN, FOREIGN-LANGUAGE UNITS OF KANSAS: HISTORICAL ATLAS AND 
STATISTICS 1–3 (1962). 
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German dialects were spoken—and continue to be spoken to this day.15  
More recently, other immigrant populations in Kansas have grown, 
especially the Hispanic community, as reflected in the following data 
from the 2000 census: 
 
Language Spoken at Home in Kansas for the  













While the Official-English movement and English-only laws are not 
new, what is new, perhaps, is the wide array of contexts in which these 
issues may arise and the variety of constitutional doctrines and federal 
statutes that may be implicated.  In general terms, the cases focus on 
improper discrimination and/or interference with political liberties, 
although the issues may overlap and the specific legal questions raised 
by a given case vary depending on the particular context in which the 
case arises. 
To bring order to the complex morass, the authors have divided the 
discussion into five parts.  Part II considers the status of legislation and 
constitutional amendments to establish English as the “official” language 
of a state or of the United States, and discusses cases seeking to enforce 
or challenge such laws.  Part III examines the distinctive issues raised at 
the intersection of Official-English or English-only laws and voting, 
including constitutional issues arising out of the right to vote and the 
                                                          
 15. William D. Keel, Deitsch, Däätsch, Düütsch, and Dietsch: The Varieties of Kansas German 
Dialects after 150 Years of German Group Settlement in Kansas, in PRESERVING HERITAGE: A 
FESTSCHRIFT FOR C. RICHARD BEAM (Joshua R. Brown and Leroy T. Hopkins, Jr. eds.), 2 
YEARBOOK OF GERMAN-AMERICAN STUDIES 27–48 (Supp. 2006). 
 16. United States Census Bureau, REPORT: LANGUAGE SPOKEN AT HOME FOR THE 
POPULATION 5 YEARS AND OVER (Apr. 2004), available at http://www.census.gov/mp/www/ 
spectab/specialtab.html. 
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Equal Protection Clause, as well as statutory issues under the Voting 
Rights Act.  Part IV focuses on education, a field in which a 
contemporary policy debate over bilingual education rages and 
constitutional issues arise alongside interpretive questions under various 
federal statutes.  Part V discusses language issues and jury service, a 
context in which issues of discrimination and participatory rights are 
further complicated by the distinctive problem of witness testimony that 
may be translated from another language.  Finally, Part VI considers 
English-only policies in the workplace, which may give rise to claims 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Equal 
Protection Clause, or the First Amendment. 
The settings and specific legal issues discussed in the different parts 
of the survey vary widely, but the fundamental underlying questions are 
the same.  What are the obligations of immigrants as members of the 
political community to learn English?  What are the obligations of 
government to accommodate linguistic differences so as to permit non-
English speakers to participate in public life?  To what extent does 
speaking a language other than English cause immigrant groups to 
remain separate from the political community at large and, conversely, to 
what extent is speaking in another language a protected political or 
personal liberty?  How can we separate legitimate concerns about 
encouraging participation in the mainstream of American life from subtle 
and hidden forms of racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination?  This 
survey makes clear that there are no easy answers to these perennial 
questions, as the courts no less than those in the political sphere continue 
to struggle with what it means to be an American. 
II. STATE AND FEDERAL OFFICIAL-ENGLISH LANGUAGE STATUTES 
A. Introduction and Background 
While the federal government has never officially declared English 
the official language, thirty states have now passed “Official-English” 
laws.17  Although the wording of these laws varies greatly from state to 
state, they can generally be divided into one of three categories.  The first 
group is sometimes referred to as “obligatory” or “English-only” statutes.  
These statutes specify that English is to be the only language used for 
government documents, meetings, and all other official actions.18  Due to 
                                                          
 17. English as Our Official Language, http://www.proenglish.org/issues/offeng/states.html (last 
visited Dec. 8, 2008). 
 18. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII; ALASKA STAT. § 44.12.320 (2007). 
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their restrictive nature, these statutes have been subjected to significant 
litigation with First Amendment implications.  The second group of 
statutes is an intermediary group, which includes statutes that are more 
than symbolic in nature, but do not go so far as to require that English be 
the only language of government.  The last group is often referred to as 
“symbolic” Official-English statutes, which usually include a brief 
statement declaring English to be the state’s official language, similar to 
the way a state may declare a state bird, fish, or song.19  These symbolic 
statutes are rarely the subject of litigation because they have few, if any, 
legal effects.  This section will discuss a history of federal attempts to 
establish English as the official language as well as the litigation trends 
involving state Official-English statutes. 
B. Federal Official-English Legislation 
While over a third of Americans believe English to be the official 
language of the United States, the federal government has never formally 
recognized it as such.  A modern movement to establish English as the 
official language began in 1981 when U.S. Senator Hayakawa presented 
an Official-English constitutional amendment to Congress.20  While the 
amendment was not ratified, his proposal spurred similar efforts in many 
state governments.21  Almost every congressional legislative session 
since 1981 has seen a proposed Official-English amendment to the 
Constitution.22 
In May 2006, the Senate approved two bills that, if adopted by the 
House and approved by the President, would have taken a large step 
toward establishing English as the official language of the United States.  
The first bill, known as the Inhofe Amendment, after Oklahoma Senator 
James Inhofe, was passed by a 64-34 vote.23  This amendment was added 
to the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act and would have required 
the government to “preserve and enhance the role of English as the 
                                                          
 19. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-4-117 (West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 1-2-10-1 (West 
2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2.013 (West 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 145-12 (West 2000). 
 20. Marla B. Somerstein, Comment, Official Language A, B, Cs: Why the Canadian Experience 
with Official Languages Does Not Support Arguments to Declare English the Official Language of 
the United States, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 251, 260 (2006). 
 21. Adriana Resendez, The Spanish Predominant Language Ordinance: Is Spanish on the Way 
In and English on the Way Out?, 32 ST. MARY’S L.J. 317, 330–31 (2001). 
 22. Somerstein, supra note 20, at 260 (citing Constitutional Topic: Official Language, The U.S. 
Constitution Online, http://www.usconstitution.net/consttop_lang.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2006)). 
 23. Carl Hulse, Senate Passes a Bill That Favors English, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2006, at A18. 
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national language of the United States.”24  Shortly thereafter, the Senate 
approved a second, slightly weaker provision known as the Salazar 
Amendment, after Colorado Senator Ken Salazar, declaring English to be 
the “common and unifying” language of the United States.25  Neither bill 
was approved by the House of Representatives. 
Senator Inhofe recently introduced the National Language Act of 
2008, which was placed on the Senate’s calendar.  While the bill sought 
to declare English the national language, it stated that it would not 
“prohibit the use of a language other than English.”26  A companion bill 
was proposed in the House of Representatives by Representative Peter 
King of New York.27 
C.  State Official-English Laws in the Courts 
1. English-Only Provisions: First Amendment Challenges 
This section discusses cases construing English-only provisions in 
state statutes and constitutions.  As demonstrated below, these statutes 
run afoul of the First Amendment in that they require English to be the 
only language spoken by elected officials and government employees.  
Courts have consistently held that these English-only provisions are an 
unconstitutional restriction on citizens’ rights to communicate with 
elected officials and constituents. 
a. Arizona’s Official-English Amendment 
In 1987, Arizonans for Official English (AOE) proposed a ballot 
initiative to amend Arizona’s state constitution to declare English the 
state’s official language.28  In addition to declaring English the official 
language of ballots, public schools, and all government functions and 
actions, the amendment, Article XXVIII, states that all political 
subdivisions were to “‘act in English and in no other language.’”29  In 
November of that year, the amendment was passed after receiving 
                                                          
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. National Language Act of 2008, S. 2715 110th Cong. (2008). 
 27. See Support the National Language Act of 2007, http://www.proenglish.org/issues/offeng/ 
769.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2008). 
 28. Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 987 (Ariz. 1998). 
 29. Id. (quoting ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII § 3(1)(a)). 
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affirmative votes from only 50.5% of Arizona voters.30  Within two days 
of ratification of Article XXVIII, challenges to its constitutionality under 
the U.S. Constitution began.31 
On November 10, 1988, Maria-Kelly F. Yniguez, an employee of the 
Arizona Department of Administration’s Risk Management Division, 
brought suit against the State of Arizona in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Arizona.32  Yniguez claimed that her job as an insurance 
claims manager regularly required her to speak in Spanish with persons 
who did not speak any English.33  She claimed that Article XXVIII’s 
prohibition against acting in any language other than English could cause 
her to lose her job.34  Thus, Yniguez argued that Article XXVIII violated 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 
The district court ruled that the amendment was “fatally overbroad” 
because it imposed a sweeping ban on the use of any language other than 
English.35  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding, even 
though Yniguez’s resignation from her position of employment to accept 
a different job arguably rendered the case moot.36 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, in part, to 
determine whether Yniguez’s resignation rendered the case moot.  In its 
decision, the Court repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with both the 
district court and the Ninth Circuit’s decision to rule on the case, stating 
that these courts had proceeded “without the benefit of the views of the 
Arizona Supreme Court.”37  The Court declared that “[f]ederal courts 
lack competence to rule definitively on the meaning of state 
legislation.”38  Ultimately, the Court vacated the lower courts’ decisions 
as moot, and expressed satisfaction that the Arizona Supreme Court 
would appropriately decide the issue in the then-pending case,39 Ruiz v. 
Hull.40  In its holding, the Court specifically declined to rule on the 
validity of the amendment.41 
 
                                                          
 30. Id. at 987. 
 31. Arizonans for Offical English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 49 (1997). 
 32. Id. at 49−50. 
 33. Id. at 50. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 54. 
 36. Id. at 59. 
 37. Id. at 48. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 79–80. 
 40. 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998). 
 41. Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 49. 
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Ruiz v. Hull was filed by ten bilingual plaintiffs, including four 
elected officials, five state employees, and a public school teacher.42  
Specifically, they brought the action against the Governor and Attorney 
General claiming Article XXVIII was unconstitutional because it 
prevented them from speaking Spanish in performing their government 
business.43  The trial court held that Article XXVIII did not violate the 
First Amendment because it was a content-neutral regulation, and, due to 
the lack of any evidence of discriminatory intent, it likewise did not 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.44  The court of appeals reversed in 
part on the grounds that “judicial comity” required deference to federal 
litigation, specifically, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Arizonans for 
Official English v. Arizona.45  On further appeal, the Arizona Supreme 
Court addressed the merits of the case. 
The Arizona Supreme Court began its decision recognizing that “in 
our diverse society, the importance of establishing common bonds and a 
common language between citizens is clear,” and that “the acquisition of 
English language skills is important in our society.”46  However, the 
court found that unlike other states’ Official-English provisions simply 
declaring English the official language, the Arizona provision explicitly 
prohibited government employees from using languages other than 
English, even when communicating with persons of limited English 
ability.47  The court found this to be an unconstitutional violation of the 
First Amendment because Article XXVIII “effectively cuts off 
governmental communication with thousands of limited-English-
proficient and non-English-speaking persons in Arizona.”48 
The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the government’s argument that 
the First Amendment addresses the content of communication and not 
the mode.49  According to the court, “requiring that government officials 
communicate only in a language which is incomprehensible to non-
English speaking persons . . . effectively bars communication itself” and 
therefore could not constitute a time, place, or manner restriction 
because, by its very nature, such a restriction suggests there are 
alternative means of communication.50  The court found that a corollary 
                                                          
 42. Ruiz, 957 P.2d at 988−89. 
 43. Id. at 989. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 990. 
 47. Id. at 996. 
 48. Id. at 997. 
 49. Id. at 998. 
 50. Id. 
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of the First Amendment’s right to petition for redress of grievances was 
the “right to participate equally in the political process.”51  Additionally, 
the Arizona Supreme Court found that Article XXVIII violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  The court subjected 
Article XXVIII to strict scrutiny on the grounds that it impinged upon 
fundamental First Amendment rights, and held that its “goal to promote 
English as the common language does not require a general prohibition 
on non-English usage.”52 
Finally, having found the amendment unconstitutional, the Arizona 
Supreme Court declined to sever unconstitutional provisions in order to 
sustain the remainder of the amendment.53  The court determined that the 
valid portions of the amendment could be severed only if the court could 
determine from its language that the voters would have decided to enact 
the provision absent the unconstitutional portions.54  Finding no 
severability clause or evidence that the voters would have enacted the 
amendment without the unconstitutional portions, the court held that it 
was “not possible to sanitize the Amendment.”55 
b. Oklahoma’s Initiative Petition No. 366 
In May of 2000, Oklahoma State Senator Carol Martin and State 
Representative Tom Kirby began Initiative Petition No. 366 to enact an 
Official-English statute in Oklahoma.56  Prior to its presentation to the 
electorate as a referendum, the Oklahoma Supreme Court conducted a 
“pre-election review” of the petition to determine whether it was 
constitutionally flawed.57  After determining that the petition was 
“fraught with infirmities,” the court determined it would be “a disservice 
to the citizens of Oklahoma to submit a petition which could not 
withstand a constitutional attack to a state-wide vote.”58 
As proposed, Initiative Petition No. 366 would declare English the 
official language of Oklahoma and require that “all official documents, 
transactions, proceedings, meetings and publications . . . be in 
English . . . .”59  Additionally, the petition would “require the return to 
                                                          
 51. Id. at 1000. 
 52. Id. at 1001. 
 53. Id. at 1002. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. In re Initiative Petition No. 366, 46 P.3d 123, 124–25 (Okla. 2002). 
 57. Id. at 125. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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the general revenue fund all money” budgeted for the translation or 
printing of official materials in languages other than English.60  Finally, 
the petition provided exceptions for any conflicts with federal or state 
laws as well as for educational institutions.61 
In its evaluation of the petition, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
compared it to the Arizona provision that was deemed unconstitutional 
by the Ninth Circuit as well as the Arizona Supreme Court.62  The court 
found “that the Oklahoma Constitution is more protective of speech than 
is the United States Constitution.”63  The court determined that the 
language of the petition would “prohibit all governmental 
communications, both written and oral, by government employees, 
elected officials, and citizens, of all words, even those which are of 
common usage, in any language other than English when conducting 
state business.”64  Thus, the petition sought “to prevent citizens of limited 
English proficiency from effectively communicating with government 
officials and from receiving . . . vital information about government.”65  
Such a restriction would “disenfranchise segments of Oklahoma citizens 
by interfering with their ability to access vital information . . . and cause 
self-censorship by inhibiting communications with government 
officials.”66 
c. Alaska’s Official-English Statute 
In 1998, the Alaskan non-profit corporation, Alaskans for a Common 
Language, Inc., sponsored a ballot initiative to make English the state’s 
official language.67  Voters approved the initiative and it was codified in 
1999.68  Thereafter, two separate groups of plaintiffs brought suit 
challenging the new law.  The first groupthe Kritz plaintiffswas 
made up of three Togiak residents: a bilingual citizen, a bilingual elected 
official, and an elected official who spoke only the Yup’ik language.69  
The second group of plaintiffsthe Alakayak plaintiffswere residents 
of native villages who spoke either English and another language, or 
                                                          
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 126. 
 63. Id. at 126–27. 
 64. Id. at 123. 
 65. Id. at 127. 
 66. Id. at 127–28. 
 67. Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183, 187 (Alaska 2007). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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were unable to communicate in English at all.70  Both groups challenged 
the statute on the ground that it adversely affected their ability to 
communicate with or participate in government.71 
The cases were consolidated and the superior court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.72  That court rejected the defendants’ 
argument that the initiative was “purely symbolic” and found the law to 
be unconstitutional.73  Ultimately, the court determined the initiative 
could not be saved by severing the unconstitutional provisions because it 
was not evident the voters would have approved the measure in that 
form.74  Defendants appealed75 and the case was brought before the 
Supreme Court of Alaska. 
The Supreme Court of Alaska began its analysis by taking notice that 
of the many Official-English statutes in place nationwide, the Alaska 
statute was most similar to the highly restrictive statutes struck down in 
Oklahoma and Arizona.76  The court concluded that the broad first 
sentence in the statute declaring English “the language to be used by all 
public agencies in all government functions and actions”77 was 
unconstitutional because it “adversely affects the recipient speech rights 
of Alaska citizens with limited English proficiency” as well as their 
“ability to effectively petition the government.”78  Additionally, the 
statute violated the rights of government officials because it barred them 
from helping citizens with limited English abilities secure government 
services and participate in civil life.79  While the state’s interest in 
promoting unity among Alaskans through a common language is a 
compelling one, the court determined the English-only provision was not 
narrowly tailored to achieve its end.80 
Unlike the determination made by the Arizona Supreme Court in 
Ruiz v. Hull, the Supreme Court of Alaska determined its Official-
English statute could be salvaged by severing the unconstitutional part of 
the provision.81  Based largely on the existence of a severability clause in 
                                                          
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 187–88. 
 72. Id. at 188. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 189. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 191. 
 78. Id. at 202–03. 
 79. Id. at 204. 
 80. Id. at 208. 
 81. Id. at 209. 
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the statute, the court concluded severance was appropriate.82  By 
severing as unconstitutional the first sentence in the statute, the rest of 
the statute could remain valid and English would remain the official 
language of public documents and records compiled or published by the 
government.83 
2. Intermediate Provisions: Preserving English’s Role 
This section addresses litigation stemming from the intermediary 
group of Official-English statutes.  These statutes appear to be more than 
symbolic in nature, but do not go so far as to require English be the only 
language of government.  Common to these statutes is a provision 
prohibiting state officials from enacting any law or provision that would 
diminish the role of English as the common language.  As discussed 
below, these statutes do not run afoul of the Constitution, and are usually 
upheld.  At the same time, courts have interpreted such provisions 
narrowly so as to allow government and government officials to 
accommodate limited-English proficient citizens. 
a. Alabama’s Official-English Statute 
On June 5, 1990, Alabama voted to amend its state constitution to 
include an Official-English provision.84  As ratified, the amendment 
states in part: 
English is the official language of the state of Alabama.  The legislature 
shall enforce this amendment by appropriate legislation.  The 
legislature and officials of the state of Alabama shall take all steps 
necessary to insure that the role of English as the common language of 
the state of Alabama is preserved and enhanced.  The legislature shall 
make no law which diminishes or ignores the role of English as the 
common language of the state of Alabama.85 
As a result of this amendment, the Alabama Department of Public Safety 
decided to administer state driver’s license examinations solely in 
English.86  As part of the policy, the Department banned all use of 
                                                          
 82. Id. at 212–13. 
 83. Id. at 211−12. 
 84. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.01 (1990). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279 (2001). 
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interpreters, translation dictionaries, and any other interpretive aids.87  
This decision led to a pair of cases whose holdings fall short of requiring 
the exams be administered in other languages, but which indicate that 
administering exams in languages other than English does not violate this 
provision. 
In 1996, Martha Sandoval brought a class action in the U.S. District 
Court for the Middle District of Alabama to enjoin application of the 
English-only examination policy.88  Sandoval argued that the policy 
discriminated against non-English speakers based on their national origin 
in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.89  The district 
court found for Sandoval and granted the injunction.90  The Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding, stating that the “English-
only official policy constituted a disparate impact on the basis of national 
origin.”91 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.92  
In its holding, the Court declined to rule on whether the previous courts 
were correct in their determination that the policy had the effect of 
discriminating on the basis of national origin.93  Rather, the Court 
addressed only whether the plaintiff in the case had a private cause of 
action under Title VI.  Once the Court determined such a right of action 
did not exist, it reversed the lower courts’ rulings. 
Following the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Sandoval, the 
Department reversed its policy and began administering the exams in 
languages other than English.94  This prompted the second of the two 
cases construing the Alabama Official-English amendment.  In response 
to the changes in the Department’s policy, several members of the 
nonprofit organization “ProEnglish” filed suit against the Governor of 
Alabama and the director of the Alabama Department of Public Safety.95  
The plaintiffs argued, given the Supreme Court’s reversal of the Eleventh 
Circuit, the Sandoval holding—that the “English-only” driver’s license 
examination policy violated Title VI—had no precedential value; 
                                                          
 87. Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 488 (11th Cir. 1999), rev’d sub nom. Alexander v. 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
 88. Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1244 (M.D. Ala. 1998), aff’d, 197 F.3d 484, rev’d 
sub nom. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1313–16. 
 91. Sandoval, 197 F.3d at 511. 
 92. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 294. 
 93. Id. at 279. 
 94. Cole v. Riley, 989 So. 2d 1001, 1004 (Ala. 2007). 
 95. Id. at 1002. 
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therefore, Alabama’s current policy of offering the exam in languages 
other than English violated the Alabama Constitution.96 
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds 
that the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Sandoval was still binding 
precedent because the case had been reversed on procedural grounds.97  
In their response, the plaintiffs failed to make any evidentiary 
submissions to establish that the policy of “English-only” driver’s license 
exams was necessary to preserve and enhance English as the official 
language, or that providing the exams in multiple languages led to its 
erosion.98  As a result, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the defendants.99  Finding itself bound by the same standard in its 
review, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed on the grounds that the 
plaintiffs “failed to provide evidence creating a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether multiple-language testing diminishes or erodes English 
as Alabama’s common language or that English-only testing is necessary 
to preserve and enhance English as Alabama’s common language.”100 
b. California’s Official-English Amendment 
In 1986, California voters passed Proposition 63, which amended 
their state constitution to include an Official-English provision.  The 
provision, article III, section 6, of the California Constitution, states in 
part: 
English is the common language of the people of the United States of 
America and the State of California.  This section is intended to 
preserve, protect, and strengthen the English language, and not to 
supersede any of the rights guaranteed to the people by this 
Constitution . . . .  The Legislature and officials of the State of 
California shall take all steps necessary to insure that the role of 
English as the common language of the State of California is preserved 
and enhanced.101 
In 2001, the amendment’s effect was the subject of litigation in a case 
against the California State Bar.  Simon S. Levy filed a complaint against 
the California State Bar seeking an injunction against its production and 
                                                          
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1003. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1005. 
 101. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 6(a), (c). 
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distribution of informational pamphlets in languages other than 
English.102  The two pamphlets specifically referred to in his complaint 
were published in Spanish.103  The first was an instructional pamphlet 
informing the reader what to do after an arrest.104  The second was 
merely a sheet of paper given to visitors of the State Bar Court 
explaining that they could be subject to search.105  Levy’s theory was that 
article III, section 6, of the California Constitution precluded the State 
Bar from printing and distributing the pamphlets.106 
The trial court granted summary judgment for the State Bar, finding 
that the California Constitution did not preclude the printing or 
distributing of materials in languages other than English.107  The Court of 
Appeals found that nothing in the language of the constitution precluded 
a “governmental body, such as the State Bar, from voluntarily printing 
and distributing consumer materials in languages other than English.”108  
The court determined that the meaning of “official” language was that 
English was the “authorized” language, and that there was no indication 
from the amendment that “authorized” meant “exclusive.”109  In sum, the 
court held that Levy erred in his failure to “distinguish between an 
entitlement and a voluntary governmental act.”110  The amendment did 
not preclude a governmental body from voluntarily printing and 
distributing materials in languages other than English. 
3. Symbolic Official-English Statutes 
The final section addresses litigation stemming from strictly 
symbolic Official-English statutes.  Similar to the statutes in the last 
section, these statutes never run afoul of the Constitution.  They are often 
cited by parties attempting to show a policy favoring English; however, 
they have never been extended to require government to act solely in 
English. 
                                                          
 102. Levy v. Davis, No. A098306, 2003 WL 157555, at *1 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. Jan. 23, 2003). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at *2. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at *4. 
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a. The Illinois Official-English Statute 
In 1972, four individual plaintiffs along with the not-for-profit group 
Puerto Rican Organization for Political Action brought a class action 
against the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners to compel them to 
provide Spanish-language voter assistance at the upcoming November 
election.111  The four individual plaintiffs were Puerto Rican-born U.S. 
citizens who had been educated in Puerto Rico and did not know enough 
English to vote effectively without assistance.112  The district court 
granted an injunction requiring the requested language assistance; the 
Board appealed to the Seventh Circuit, in part, on the ground that the 
injunction would require them to violate the Illinois Official-English 
statute.113 
Defendants argued that the then-current provision declaring English 
the official languagealong with naming the state bird and 
songprohibited providing the voter assistance.114  After finding the 
superseded provision no longer effective, the court rejected such a strict 
application of the current provision stating that it had “never been used to 
prevent publication of official materials in other languages,” and that 
“various state and city agencies publish numerous materials and provide 
many services in Spanish.”115 
b. Indiana’s Official-English Statute 
On April 15, 1994, the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles determined 
Jamie Vasquez to be a habitual traffic violator and suspended his license 
for ten years.116  Prior to this determination, Vasquez had been convicted 
three times for driving while intoxicated and once for leaving the scene 
of a personal injury accident.117  The notice of his ten-year suspension, 
written in English, was mailed to his residence.118  On June 5, 1994, 
Vasquez was stopped while driving and convicted of operating a vehicle 
after suspension for habitual traffic violations.119  He appealed his 
                                                          
 111. Puerto Rican Org. for Political Action v. Kusper, 490 F.2d 575, 576 (7th Cir. 1973). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 576–77. 
 114. Id. at 577. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Vasquez v. State, 700 N.E.2d 1157, 1157−58 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). 
 117. Id. at 1157. 
 118. Id. at 1158. 
 119. Id. 
07 0_ASSOCIATE EDITOR FINAL 3/8/2009  5:00:43 PM 
686 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
conviction on the grounds that the suspension was not valid because the 
notice he received was in English and he could not read English.120 
At the outset of its analysis, the court noted that Indiana Code section 
1-2-10-1 declared English to be the official language of Indiana.121  
Additionally, by statute, the driver’s license examination included a test 
of one’s ability to adequately read and understand traffic signs, and 
Indiana Code section 9-24-2-3(a)(4) prohibited issuance of a license to 
any individual who could not understand highway warning signs.122  In 
its ultimate holding, the court made an analogy to the Ninth Circuit’s 
hesitation in previous cases to require the government to prepare all INS 
forms in both English and Spanish.123  Ultimately, the court held that the 
Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles was not required “to determine 
whether its drivers are literate, and if so, in what language.”124 
c. Florida’s Official-English Provision 
In the 1988 general election, Florida voters amended the state 
constitution to include an Official-English provision.125  The amendment 
contains little more than a statement that “English is the official language 
of the State of Florida.”126 
At the time the amendment was codified, Dade County had in place 
an “anti-bilingual” ordinance that had been adopted in 1980 through the 
ballot initiative process.127  The Dade County Commission thereafter 
passed Dade County Ordinance No. 93-46, which repealed the “anti-
bilingual” ordinance.128  This action was challenged in the Dade County 
Circuit Court, in part on the grounds that repealing the “anti-bilingual” 
ordinance violated the Official-English provision in the Florida 
Constitution.129  Both the circuit court and the Florida District Court of 
Appeal held that repealing the “anti-bilingual” ordinance did not violate 
the amendment.130 
                                                          
 120. Id. at 1157. 
 121. Id. at 1158. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 1159. 
 124. Id. 
 125. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 9(a). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Martin v. Metro. Dade County, 637 So. 2d 313, 313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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D. Conclusion 
Despite consistent attempts since the early 1980s, Congress has 
never definitively established English as the official language of the 
United States.  On the other hand, over thirty states have passed some 
form of Official-English legislation.  These state laws fall into one of 
three categories: English-only laws which preclude the use of languages 
other than English in government affairs, intermediary statutes 
establishing a policy of enhancing the use of English within the state, and 
symbolic statutes merely declaring English to be the official language.  
While all have been litigated, it is the first group of statutes that has 
consistently been struck down by the courts as unconstitutional 
restrictions on citizens’ rights to communicate with elected officials and 
constituents. 
III. LANGUAGE REGULATION AND VOTING LAWS 
A. Introduction and Background 
In 1975, in response to evidence of continued voter discrimination 
against language minority voters, Congress amended the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 to include language assistance provisions.131  These 
provisions§§ 4(f)(4) and 203identify jurisdictions in which language 
assistance is required, and specifically mandate that written voting 
materials in the applicable language be provided at “‘all stages of the 
electoral process.’”132  As of 2006, the Act required roughly 500 political 
subdivisions from thirty-one states to provide bilingual voting 
assistance.133  Five statesAlaska, Arizona, California, New Mexico, 
and Texasare required by the Act to provide bilingual voter assistance 
statewide.134 
There are two triggering statutes that could subject a jurisdiction to 
the language assistance provision of the Voting Rights Act.  Under § 
4(f)(4), a jurisdiction is subject to the Act if three criteria were met as of 
November 1, 1972.135  These criteria include: (1) over five percent of 
                                                          
 131. James Thomas Tucker, The Politics of Persuasion: Passage of the Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization Act of 2006, 33 J. LEGIS. 205, 223 (2006). 
 132. Id. at 224–25 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 55.15 (1976)). 
 133. Editorial, Yes on Bilingual Ballots: Encourage Non-English Speakers To Make Informed 
Choices, WASH. POST, July 10, 2006, at A16. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Tucker, supra note 131, at 224. 
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voting age citizens were members of a single language group; (2) the 
jurisdiction used English-only election materials; and (3) less than fifty 
percent of voting age citizens were registered to vote or voted in the 
1972 Presidential election.136 
The second triggering provision, § 203, applies to a given 
jurisdiction if the Director of the Census makes two determinations.  
First, that “the limited-English proficient citizens of voting age in a 
single language group: (a) number more than 10,000; (b) comprise more 
than five percent of all citizens of voting age; or (c) comprise more than 
five percent of all American Indians of a single language group residing 
on an Indian reservation,” and second, that the illiteracy rate of the 
language minority citizens in the jurisdiction exceeds the national 
illiteracy rate.137  The provision begins with Congress’s express finding 
and declaration: 
[T]hrough the use of various practices and procedures, citizens of 
language minorities have been effectively excluded from participation 
in the electoral process.  Among other factors, the denial of the right to 
vote of such minority group citizens is ordinarily directly related to the 
unequal educational opportunities afforded them resulting in high 
illiteracy and low voting participation.  The Congress declares that, in 
order to enforce the guarantees of the fourteenth and fifteenth 
amendments to the United States Constitution, it is necessary to 
eliminate such discrimination by prohibiting these practices, and by 
prescribing other remedial devices.138 
The provision defines persons of “limited-English proficiency” as those 
who speak English “less than very well” and would need assistance to 
participate effectively in the political process.139 
If a jurisdiction meets the requirements of § 203, when it provides 
“any registration or voting notices, forms, instructions, assistance, or 
other materials or information relating to the electoral process, including 
ballots, it shall provide them in the language of the applicable minority 
group as well as in the English language.”140  Where the language of the 
group is oral, or as in the case of Alaskan natives and American Indians, 
the language is historically unwritten, § 203 requires that the state or 
political subdivision “furnish oral instructions, assistance, or other 
                                                          
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 203, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973aa-1a(a) (2003). 
 139. Tucker, supra note 131, at 224. 
 140. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973aa-1a(c). 
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information relating to registration and voting.”141  In sum, this section 
prohibits these jurisdictions from conducting their elections solely in 
English. 
 
B. Litigation of Federal Regulations Regarding Bilingual Ballots and 
Voting Materials 
 
In Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec,142 the Ninth Circuit 
held that a good faith effort is not a defense to violations of the Voting 
Rights Act.  In that case, Chinese and Spanish speaking plaintiffs 
brought an action alleging that the City of San Francisco failed to comply 
with the bilingual election provisions in the Voting Rights Act.143  The 
defendants argued that the city’s failure to comply was reasonable 
because it was not deemed to be covered by the Act until September and 
had “only a few days in which to make the contracts and accomplish the 
changes necessary to modify its election procedures to comply with the 
Act before the November elections.”144  The court held that good faith 
was not an applicable defense and that shortage of time would not 
“shield election officials from the diligent assertion of rights under the 
Act” because it was Congress’s intent to “eradicate voting discrimination 
with all possible speed.”145 
Litigation often stems from the confusion over what materials the 
Voting Rights Act requires be translated in covered jurisdictions.  For 
example, in In re County of Monterey Initiative Matter,146 a group of 
Spanish-speaking citizens brought suit against Monterey County, 
California, for failing to circulate an initiative petition and accompanying 
materials in Spanish.  Monterey County was covered under § 203 of the 
Voting Rights Act and as a result was required to provide ballots and 
other voting materials in Spanish.147  A group of citizens began an 
initiative petition to amend certain zoning and land development 
provisions.148  The county approved the form and content of the initiative 
for circulation among voters and provided it and accompanying summary  
 
                                                          
 141. Id. 
 142. 580 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 143. Id. at 1008. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. 427 F. Supp. 2d 958 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 147. Id. at 958–59. 
 148. Id. at 959. 
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materials to be published in the newspaper; however, the initiative was 
never published in Spanish.149 
The court determined that the case broke down into two primary 
questions: “(1) whether the materials qualify as ‘other materials or 
information relating to the electoral process’ and (2) whether the 
materials are ‘provided by’ the county.”150  In response to the first 
question, the court concluded that the title and summary materials 
prepared by the county did fall under the Act because these materials 
served “no purpose other than to impartially inform the voters of the 
content and effect of the proposed Initiative.”151  In response to the 
second question, the court concluded that “the County’s control of form 
and content of initiative petitions constituted extensive regulation” 
making the materials such that the County should provide them in 
Spanish as well as English.152 
In addition to private parties, the United States may bring an action 
to enforce the Voting Rights Act’s language provisions.  For example, in 
United States v. Metropolitan Dade County, Florida,153 the United States 
brought an action challenging Dade County, Florida’s decision to print 
an election information pamphlet solely in English.  The informational 
pamphlet stemmed from special run-off elections that were to be held in 
districts where candidates had not received a majority vote.154  Prior to 
the special elections, Dade County determined it would benefit voters to 
mail out pamphlets explaining the elections.155  Despite being subject to 
§ 203 of the Voting Rights Act, Dade County determined the Act did not 
apply to the informational pamphlets, and refused to print them in 
Spanish.156 
The district court rejected the county’s claim, finding that the 
“pamphlet is covered under the plain language of Section 203 as 
‘assistance or other materials or information relating to the electoral 
process.’”157  As support, the court cited 28 C.F.R. § 55.14, which states 
that the applicable language in § 203 “‘should be broadly construed to 
apply to all stages of the electoral process, from voter registration 
through activities related to conducting elections, including for example 
                                                          
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 962 (quoting Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 203, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973aa-1a(c) (2003)). 
 151. Id. at 963. 
 152. Id. at 964. 
 153. 815 F. Supp. 1475, 1477 (S.D. Fla. 1993). 
 154. Id. at 1476. 
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the issuance, at any time during the year, of notifications, 
announcements, or other informational materials . . . .’”158  The court 
found that the pamphlet not only explained the election, but also 
contained relevant information regarding when and where voters should 
register.159  Therefore, the court concluded that the pamphlet qualified 
under the Voting Rights Act and the county’s failure to provide the 
pamphlet in Spanish was a violation of the Act.160 
C. State Legislation Regarding Bilingual Ballots and Voting Materials 
Many states have their own provisions regarding the use of ballots 
and other election materials in languages other than English.  Some of 
these statutes refer expressly to the requirements mandated by the Voting 
Rights Act.161  Others follow the Voting Rights Act’s general policy of 
identifying highly concentrated bilingual areas and establish their own 
requirements for accommodating voters in those areas.162  For example, 
one New Jersey statute requires that for “election districts in which the 
primary language of 10% or more of the registered voters is Spanish, the 
officer or officers whose duty it may be . . . to provide and furnish 
official ballots” shall provide voting instructions and ballots in 
Spanish.163  Similarly, in California, the Secretary of State is required to 
post election materials in Spanish or other languages when the number of 
residents of voting age in a county or precinct “who lack sufficient skills 
in English to vote without assistance . . . equals 3 percent or more of the 
voting age residents.”164  Other states, like Kansas, simply place upon the 
Secretary of State a responsibility to print ballots and other voting 
materials in languages other than English when he or she “deems it 
advisable.”165 
D. English Literacy and the Right to Vote 
In 1970, the California Supreme Court struck down article II, section 
1 of the California Constitution on the ground that it violated the Equal 
                                                          
 158. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 55.14 (1987)). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-19-54 (2006). 
 162. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14201 (West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:49-4 (West 1999); 
25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1327 (West 2007). 
 163. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:49-4. 
 164. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14201(c). 
 165. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2706(c)(3) (Supp. 2007). 
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.166  That provision 
provided that “‘no person who shall not be able to read the Constitution 
in the English language and write his or her name, shall ever exercise the 
privileges of an elector in this State.’”167  The case was brought by two 
native born U.S. citizens residing in Los Angeles who were denied voter 
registration based on the fact that, while they could read Spanish, they 
were unable to read English.168  The plaintiffs brought an action seeking 
to have the court declare the provision unconstitutional, require the 
defendants to register them to vote, and require the defendants to print a 
reasonable number of ballots in Spanish to facilitate their ability to 
vote.169 
The plaintiffs provided evidence that they had access to Spanish 
language periodicals, newspapers, and other forms of media from which 
they could become informed on political issues.170  They also argued that 
the historical purpose of the English literacy voting requirement was to 
disenfranchise immigrant voters.171  The defendant did not challenge 
either of those issues, but provided evidence of a list of schools in Los 
Angeles at which English was taught to non-English speaking adults at 
no cost.172  Based on the pleadings, the trial court found for the 
defendants and rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that persons literate only in 
Spanish would be able to adequately “familiarize themselves with 
political candidates and issues from Spanish-language news media.”173 
The California Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine 
“whether the challenged provision [was] compatible with the demands of 
equal protection as they apply in contemporary society.”174  The court 
found that the issue in this case was not “the general question of a 
nondiscriminatory literacy requirement,” but rather “a provision which 
discriminates among literate citizens, disenfranchising all who are 
literate in languages other than English.”175  Thus, the issue became 
whether California’s desire for intelligent and independent voters “may 
be satisfied by the exclusion of those of its citizens who, while unable to 
read the dominant language, English, nonetheless have access to, and the 
                                                          
 166. Castro v. State, 466 P.2d 244, 244–45 (Cal. 1970). 
 167. Id. at 245 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1). 
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ability to utilize, those materials available through Spanish language 
publications.”176 
The court subjected the provision to strict scrutiny to determine 
whether restricting the right to vote to those literate only in English was 
necessary to achieve the compelling state interest in voters who are 
“capable of informed decisions on matters submitted to the electorate.”177  
The court went on to determine that the plaintiffs’ evidence that they had 
access to seventeen Spanish language newspapers and eleven Spanish 
magazines was sufficient to demonstrate “access to materials printed in 
Spanish which communicate substantial information on matters, not only 
of national, but also of state and local political concern.”178  It then held 
that as applied to the plaintiffs, the English literacy requirement violated 
their rights to equal protection.179  The court specifically expanded its 
holding to any case where “otherwise qualified prospective voters, 
literate in a language other than English, are able to make a comparable 
demonstration of access to sources of political information.”180 
E. Conclusion 
As of 2006, the Voting Rights Act required roughly 500 political 
subdivisions from thirty-one states to provide bilingual voting 
assistance.181  Many states that are not required to provide bilingual 
ballots under the Voting Rights Act have passed their own legislation 
incorporating the Act’s requirements to their own local elections.  Much 
of the litigation in this area stems from the confusion over what materials 
the Voting Rights Act requires be translated in covered jurisdictions. 
IV. LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION 
A. Introduction and Background 
America is a nation with a multilingual population.  America is also 
a nation that places a high emphasis on elementary and secondary 
education.  There are inherent difficulties in attempting to provide an 
education to non-English speaking students in the English language.  
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Immigration patterns are bringing “unprecedented diversity in cultural 
background[s] and languages” into the public education system in every 
state.182  The number of students with limited English proficiency in U.S. 
schools has “risen dramatically.”183  These students face a number of 
obstacles in attempting to assimilate into American schools, the most 
obvious of which is their lack of English competence.184  Language 
instruction transmits an important tool from an authority figure to a 
child.185  A vital element of an education is the recognition of authority 
figures, but if a student cannot understand authority figures, this element 
is unsatisfied.  Studies show that students who do not understand the 
language in class and who cannot communicate effectively with teachers 
are more likely to dropout or fall behind because they cannot effectively 
participate in the education program.186 
In Brown v. Board of Education,187 a unanimous Supreme Court 
stated that “education is perhaps the most important function of state and 
local governments.”188  Public schools are charged with the daunting task 
of educating children who speak little or no English, as public schools 
“bear the chief responsibility for cultivating individuals capable of 
participating in society.”189  Education of English-learning children poses 
several significant problems, many of which will be discussed in this 
portion of the survey.  Specifically, Part B will explore the bilingual 
education debate, Supreme Court jurisprudence dealing with rights of 
English-learning students, and two federal statutes that impact the 
education of English-learning students.  Part C provides an analysis of a 
recent national news-making federal court case that arose when a middle 
school required its students to speak solely in English during school 
hours.  This portion ultimately concludes that states are afforded wide 
latitude to pursue or not pursue bilingual education and that satisfying 
                                                          
 182. Marcelo Suárez-Orozco, Peter D. Roos & Carola Suárez-Orozco, Cultural, Educational, 
and Legal Perspectives on Immigration: Implications for School Reform, in LAW AND SCHOOL 
REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 162 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999). 
 183. Jana Echevarria et al., School Reform and Standards-Based Education: A Model for 
English-Language Learners, 99 J. EDUC. RES. 195, 196 (2006). 
 184. Note, Federal Funding for Newcomer Schools: A Bipartisan Immigrant Education 
Initiative, 120 HARV. L. REV. 799, 799 (2007) (arguing that the lack of formal education in the 
students’ native countries also represents a substantial obstacle). 
 185. Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language and Participation, 94 CAL. L. REV. 687, 760 (2006). 
 186. See ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN OF NEW YORK AND THE NEW YORK IMMIGRATION 
COALITION, CREATING A FORMULA FOR SUCCESS: WHY ENGLISH LANGUAGE LEARNER STUDENTS 
ARE DROPPING OUT OF SCHOOL, AND HOW TO INCREASE GRADUATION RATES 16–17, 27–28 (2002), 
available at http://www.advocatesforchildren.org/pubs/formulaforchange.doc. 
 187. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 188. Id. at 493. 
 189. Rodriguez, supra note 185, at 758. 
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the constitutional and statutory standards for the education of English-
learning students, especially in light of the No Child Left Behind Act, 
may not be as difficult as it once was. 
 
B. Rights of English-Learning Students 
 
Statistics demonstrate that the public education system is growing at 
a steady pace.  According to the Department of Education’s website, a 
record 49.8 million students are attending public schools as of fall 
2008.190  The public school systems are expected to employ about 3.3 
million teachers during the 2008-2009 academic year, “resulting in a 
pupil/teacher ratio of 15.3.”191  In the United States, “there are about 
14,200 public school districts containing about 97,000 public schools.”192  
Additionally, projected expenditures for public schools during the 2008–
2009 school year will be around $519 billion, with a national average 
expenditure per student around $10,418.193 
As the system expands as a whole, children with limited English 
competency are becoming a greater proportion of school-age students.  
By 2030, non-native English speakers are expected to make up 40% of 
the school-age population.194  “Between 1979 and 2006, the number of 
school-age children (children ages 5–17) who spoke a language other 
than English at home increased from 3.8 million to 10.8 million, or from 
9 to 20[%] of the population in this age range.”195  Furthermore, almost 
three out of four of those children spoke Spanish.196  Statistics show that 
these Spanish-speaking children have a more difficult time learning 
English than children of other languages. Specifically, “[h]igher 
percentages of children who spoke Spanish or an Asian/Pacific Islander 
language at home spoke English with [more] difficulty (27 and 28[%], 
respectively) than did those who spoke other Indo-European languages 
(19[%]) or other languages (18[%]) at home.”197 
                                                          
 190. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, “FAST FACTS,” http://nces.ed.gov/ 
fastfacts/display.asp?id=372 (last visited Feb. 3, 2009). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. CELESTE ROSEBERRY-MCKIBBIN & ALEJANDRO BRICE, AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING 
ASS’N, Acquiring English as a Second Language: What’s “Normal,” What’s Not, http:// 
www.asha.org/public/speech/development/esl.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2008). 
 195. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, LANGUAGE MINORITY SCHOOL-AGE 
CHILDREN, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2008/section1/indicator07.asp (last visited Jan. 27, 
2009). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
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In general, the public school system is becoming more diverse.  In 
2006, 43% of public school students were considered to be part of a 
racial or ethnic group, an increase from 22% in 1972 and 31% in 1986.198  
Enrollment of Hispanic students in public schools was approximately 
20% in 2006—an increase of 14% since 1972.199  Similarly, “since 1986, 
the proportion of public school students who were Hispanic has 
increased more than the proportion who were Black or members of other 
minority groups.”200 
English-language-learning students enter the public education system 
in the United States at every age, “possessing marginally to highly 
developed native language skills, little or no” English skills, and “socio-
cultural learning and experiences moderately to vastly different from” 
American society.201  Designing an effective curriculum for the vast 
array of English language learners is difficult, especially considering the 
“vast range of languages, degrees of native language and English 
proficiency, . . . varying sizes and budgets of school districts, . . . and the 
availability of trained bilingual educators in the multitude of 
languages.”202 
Some school districts have responded to the needs of non-English 
speaking students by implementing bilingual education programs that 
instruct students equally in English and another language—typically the 
student’s native language.  Bilingual education will be addressed below.  
Other school districts have started “newcomer schools which cater 
exclusively to non-English-speaking immigrant[]” students.203  
Newcomer schools help students learn English, learn about the American 
culture and how to balance the cultural environment at school with the 
native cultural environment at home, and learn academic content that 
will facilitate the student’s transition into the mainstream classroom.204  
Other school districts favor the “sink or swim” method, often called 
“English immersion.”  The perceived positives and negatives of each 
approach have been extensively debated.205 
                                                          
 198. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, RACIAL/ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF 
PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2008/section1/indicator05.asp (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2009). 
   199.    Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. William N. Myhill, The State of Public Education and the Needs of English Language 
Learners in the Era of ‘No Child Left Behind,’ 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 393, 419 (2004). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Note, supra note 184, at 799–800 (arguing that newcomer schools are the best solution but 
have failed because of a lack of adequate funding). 
 204. Id. 
 205. See generally id.; Rodriguez, supra note 185, at 758. 
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Education of minorities in their ethnic language “represents the chief 
survival mechanism for a language, because in the educational context, a 
language’s fate is sealed.”206  In Canada, a multilingual society like 
America, minority educational rights have garnered constitutional 
protections.207  Minorities in the United States have not found such 
protections.208  Currently, the only language-based educational right is a 
statutory right of non-English speaking students to programs that assist 
them in overcoming language barriers, or the right to learn English.209  
According to Meyer v. Nebraska, a state cannot prohibit the teaching of 
any language other than English without running afoul of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.210  Meyer noted that “[t]he protection of the Constitution 
extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to those 
born with English on the tongue.”211  States find very little constitutional 
guidance beyond Meyer in educating the unprecedented number of 
students with limited English skills in the public classroom. 
The Supreme Court, addressing a federal civil rights statute, has 
noted that “students who do not understand English are effectively 
foreclosed from any meaningful education” and that schools must make 
reasonable efforts to accommodate such students.212  How to provide a 
“meaningful education” to non-English speakers is an issue that has 
puzzled educators and legislators for decades.  Satisfying the 
“meaningful education” standard enunciated by the Supreme Court—and 
later codified in a federal statute—is a complicated and delicate process. 
1. The Bilingual Education Debate 
To understand the bilingual education debate, it is helpful to 
understand what is meant by the term “bilingual education.”  Broadly 
defined, bilingual education means “any use of two languages in 
school—by teachers or students or both—for a variety of social and 
pedagogical purposes.”213  The teaching methods widely vary: 
                                                          
 206. Rodriguez, supra note 185, at 758. 
 207. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 
(U.K.). 
 208. Some state constitutions afford students a right to an adequate education. 
 209. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (holding that the school system’s failure to 
provide English language instruction to students of Chinese ancestry who do not speak English 
violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 while not reaching the question of whether it violated the 
Equal Protection Clause). 
 210. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 211. Id. at 401. 
 212. Lau, 414 U.S. at 566 (construing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 213. Nat’l Ass’n for Bilingual Educ., What Is Bilingual Education?, http://www.nabe.org/ 
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[B]ilingual education methods vary and may involve classrooms with 
all [limited-English-speaking students], classrooms with a mix of 
[limited-English-speaking students] and native English speakers (who 
learn such languages as Spanish or Chinese), or a rapid (one to three 
years) or gradual (five to six years) transition to all-English 
classrooms.214 
Instruction may be in the native language and English or primarily in 
English with some native language support.215  The Supreme Court, 
construing a federal civil rights statute, has stated that states are not 
required to provide bilingual education, but may do so on their own 
initiative.216 
There are two dimensions to the bilingual education debate: English 
language acquisition and native language maintenance.217  Some argue 
that “effective pedagogy for the English language learner must target” 
both dimensions.218  Whether the public education system should be 
charged with perpetuating the multilingual character of American society 
is the crux of the bilingual education debate.  Another crucial component 
of the debate is whether non-native speakers have the responsibility to 
learn English or whether the government must cater to their inability to 
do so.  Who bears the burden—the students or the public education 
system—affects issues such as bilingual instruction and the strategies for 
integration of non-native students.  The bilingual education debate has 
been called “the most explosive issue” in all of America’s language 
debates.219  The dichotomy between the two sides of the debate can be 
staggering. 
Proponents of bilingual education assert that bilingualism: (1) is 
necessary in a multicultural society; (2) helps students improve and 
maintain high academic achievement; and (3) is essential for ensuring 
that English language-learners have the same access to education 
afforded to native-English speakers.220  Opponents of bilingual education 
                                                                                                                       
education/index.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2009). 
 214. Bethany Li, Note, Poverty, Migration, and Trafficking in Persons: From Bilingual 
Education to OELALEAALEPS: How the No Child Left Behind Act Has Undermined English 
Language Learners’ Access to a Meaningful Education, 14 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 539, 
544 (2007). 
 215. Nat’l Ass’n for Bilingual Educ., What Is Bilingual Education?, http://www.nabe.org/ 
education/index.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2009). 
 216. See generally Lau, 414 U.S. 563. 
 217. Rodriguez, supra note 185, at 759. 
 218. Myhill, supra note 201, at 404–05. 
 219. Rodriguez, supra note 185, at 758. 
 220. See Jill Kerper Mora, A Road Map to the Bilingual Education Controversy, 
http://coe.sdsu.edu/people/jmora/Prop227/BERoadmap.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2009). 
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maintain that: (1) parents and not the schools should have primary 
responsibility for maintaining the students’ native language; (2) 
bilingualism is an “impediment” to academic achievement; and (3) 
English immersion is more effective than bilingual education, especially 
considering the additional time and costs needed for bilingual 
education.221  Bilingual education has been deemed an abject failure by 
critics; yet proponents believe that “[c]onsiderable research supports the 
conclusion that students in properly designed bilingual programs 
consistently outperform peers in English-only classrooms.”222  There is 
no consensus among researchers as to the efficacy of a bilingual 
education. 
In 1968, Congress began funding bilingual education programs 
through the Bilingual Education Act (BEA).223  The BEA was the “first 
official federal recognition of bilingual education” and was reauthorized 
in 1974, 1978, 1984, and finally in 1994.224  The BEA encouraged states 
to “eliminate English-only instruction policies in schools” and provided 
funding for low income schools to develop bilingual programs that 
would transition limited English proficient students toward 
proficiency.225  A Supreme Court case, Lau v. Nichols,226 and a Fifth 
Circuit case, Castaneda v. Pickard,227 helped to clarify the requirements 
of federally-funded bilingual education programs by requiring schools to 
ensure that English-language-learning students obtain an education equal 
to that of native English speaking students, and by providing standards 
for appropriate language instruction programs.228 
In the 1974 case of Lau v. Nichols, the United States Supreme Court 
held that “the San Francisco public schools violated their obligations 
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by failing to provide 
programs for [limited-English] students of Chinese ancestry to assist 
them in learning English.”229  Title VI bans discrimination based “on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin” in “any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance,” including public educational 
                                                          
 221. See id. 
 222. Rodriguez, supra note 185, at 761 n.284. 
 223. Li, supra note 214, at 549. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Alberto T. Fernandez & Sarah W.J. Pell, The Right to Receive Bilingual Special Education, 
53 EDUC. L. REP. 1067, 1069 (1989). 
 226. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
 227. 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981). 
 228. Li, supra note 214, at 549. 
 229. Rodriguez, supra note 185, at 759. 
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institutions.230  “The essential premise of Lau [is] that all students must 
have adequate access to English-language instruction.”231  The Court 
stated that “there is no equality of treatment merely by providing 
students with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum; for 
students who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed from 
any meaningful education.”232  Subsequent cases have held that Lau does 
not require schools to provide limited-English students with a bilingual-
bicultural education; rather, schools need only “‘take affirmative steps to 
rectify language deficiencies.’”233  When Lau required schools in 1974 to 
“overcome language barrier[s],” the Supreme Court did not mandate one 
“correct” education choice for children who spoke little English.234 
Lau sparked an intense debate over how schools can fulfill their Title 
VI obligations.  Some argue that Title VI requires bilingual education 
that includes native-language instruction, while others argue that English 
immersion classes are sufficient.235  “With one . . . exception, no court 
has held that Title VI requires bilingual education specifically.”236  
Whether to provide a bilingual education is a choice left to individual 
states by popular vote.  Some states have enacted laws requiring school 
districts to establish programs of transitional bilingual education for 
students of limited English-speaking ability.237 
While Congress has never adopted legislation mandating an official 
national language, many states have adopted various forms of Official-
English legislation and have mandated that English be the only 
instructional language used in public schools.238  Some argue that this 
type of instruction not only makes it difficult for non-English speaking 
children to receive meaningful education, but may also be detrimental to 
their familial and social integration.239  Only recently have states begun 
to prohibit schools from using non-English speaking students’ native 
                                                          
 230. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). 
 231. Rodriguez, supra note 185, at 759. 
 232. Lau, 414 U.S. at 566. 
 233. Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 
1978) (quoting 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (1970)). 
 234. Lau, 414 U.S. at 568. 
 235. Rodriguez, supra note 185, at 759. 
 236. Id.; United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (imposing bilingual 
education as remedy in school desegregation suit), rev’d, 680 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 237. See, e.g., Filar v. Bd. of Educ., 526 F.3d 1054, 1056 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 238. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-404 (West 2007) (stating that English is to be the sole 
language of instruction in public schools).  See generally supra Part II. 
 239. See Mei-Yu Lu, English-Only Movement: Its Consequences on the Education of Language 
Minority Children, 1998, http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sq1/content_storage_01/ 
0000019b/80/29/c0/d4.pdf. 
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languages in teaching them English and other subjects.240  While these 
native language bans, passed through popular referenda in at least three 
states—California, Arizona, and Massachusetts—may not impede 
English acquisition, they probably do impede native language 
retention.241 
2. Equal Educational Opportunities Act 
Congress essentially codified Lau’s holding in enacting the Equal 
Educational Opportunities Act (EEOA).242  The statute provides that 
“[n]o state shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on 
account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin, by the failure by 
an educational agency to take appropriate action to overcome language 
barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its instructional 
programs.”243  As explained by the Ninth Circuit: 
The EEOA was intended to remedy the linguistic discrimination 
identified by Lau . . . , in which the Supreme Court held that failing to 
provide for the needs of non-English speaking students “is to make a 
mockery of public education,” rendering classroom experiences for 
these children “wholly incomprehensible and in no way 
meaningful.”244 
The EEOA mandates “‘that schools are not free to ignore the need of 
limited English speaking children for language assistance to enable them 
to participate in the instructional programs of the district.’”245  State 
education agencies have the obligation to supervise local districts to 
ensure compliance with the EEOA.246  While the EEOA does not require 
bilingual education, it does require states to expend resources to ensure 
that non-English speaking students receive an equal and meaningful 
education. 
 
                                                          
 240. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-752 (Lexis Nexis 2005) (“All children in Arizona public schools 
shall be taught English by being taught in English . . . .”); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 305 (Deering 2005) 
(“All children in California public schools shall be taught English by being taught in English.”); 
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71A, § 4 (Lexis Nexis 2005) (same). 
 241. See Rodriguez, supra note 185, at 759. 
 242. Equal Educational Opportunities Act, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 515 (codified as 
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1703–58 (1974)). 
 243. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2006). 
 244. Flores v. Arizona, 516 F.3d 1140, 1145–46 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lau v. Nichols, 414 
U.S. 563, 566 (1974)). 
 245. Id. (quoting Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1008 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
 246. Idaho Migrant Council v. Bd. of Educ., 647 F.2d 69, 71 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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The EEOA has been interpreted as “mandat[ing] remedial assistance 
to students with English language deficits, regardless of the number, ‘[a]s 
long as there is at least one person arguably denied equal educational 
opportunity.’”247  The generally accepted elements of a violation of the 
EEOA are: “(1) the denial of educational opportunity on account of race, 
color, sex, or national origin; and (2) the educational agency’s failure to 
take action to overcome language barriers that are sufficiently severe so 
as to impede a student’s equal participation in instructional programs.”248  
Challenges to the EEOA often arise when plaintiffs oppose a state statute 
doing away with bilingual education.  When opposing a state statute 
replacing a bilingual education system with an English immersion 
system, plaintiffs must establish that the English immersion system could 
not, in any circumstance, constitute “appropriate action” to overcome 
language barriers.249 
In the litigation context, courts take a holistic look at the school 
system’s operations relative to education of English-language-learning 
students.  The analytical framework of the EEOA that was provided by 
the Fifth Circuit in Castaneda is three-fold: 
First, courts must be satisfied that the school system is pursuing a 
program informed by an educational theory recognized as sound by 
some experts in the field or, at least, deemed a legitimate experimental 
strategy.  Second, the programs and practices actually used by a school 
system must be reasonably calculated to implement effectively the 
educational theory adopted by the school.  There must, in other words, 
be sufficient practices, resources and personnel to transform the theory 
into reality.  Third, even if theory is sound and resources are adequate, 
the program must be borne out by practical results.250 
After a violation is detected, courts have the power to institute 
measures that will remedy any illegality and bring programs into 
compliance with a “remedial decree tailored to address the specific 
violation.”251  Because precedents for defining an “appropriate” program 
are lacking, courts often rely on the Fifth Circuit’s three-fold framework 
to evaluate challenges to a school district’s education program under the 
EEOA.252 
                                                          
 247. Heavy Runner v. Bremner, 522 F. Supp. 162, 164 (D. Mont. 1981) (quoting United States 
v. Sch. Dist. of Ferndale, 577 F.2d 1339, 1345 (6th Cir. 1978)). 
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3. The No Child Left Behind Act 
The overarching emphasis of The No Child Left Behind Act 
(NCLB)253 is English language proficiency.  There are many who view 
NCLB as the federal government’s attempt to do away with bilingual 
education.254  NCLB, unveiled by President George W. Bush in 2001, 
renamed the “Bilingual Education Act” to the “English Language 
Acquisition, Language Enhancement, and Academic Achievement 
Act.”255  “NCLB . . . [also] eliminated the Office of Bilingual Education 
and Minority Language Affairs and replaced it with the Office of English 
Language Acquisition, Language Enhancement, and Academic 
Achievement for Limited-English-Proficient Students” (OELA).256  
NCLB’s stated goals reflect a high priority on English acquisition and 
seem to neglect bilingual education, at least facially.257  NCLB aims “to 
help ensure that children who are limited English proficient, including 
immigrant children and youth, attain English proficiency, develop high 
levels of academic attainment in English, and meet the same challenging 
State academic content and student academic achievement standards as 
all children are expected to meet.”258  To aid in this goal, NCLB provides 
grants to states with federal government-approved plans to benefit 
English-language-learning students.259 
There is no explicit denunciation of bilingual education in NCLB.  
NCLB states that it seeks to ensure flexibility in the types of language 
instruction programs that state and local education agencies choose to 
teach students with limited English proficiency.260  NCLB “does not deal 
in the immediate, rights-based framework inherent in civil rights law, 
although it is intended to ameliorate over the longer haul the conditions 
that lead to civil rights violations.”261  Nothing in the NCLB “shall be 
construed in a manner inconsistent with any Federal law guaranteeing a 
                                                                                                                       
what “appropriate” means under § 1703(f) is Castaneda v. Pickard). 
 253. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
 254. See, e.g., Myhill, supra note 201, at 446 (discussing generally NCLB, and that it seems to 
repeal state and federal bilingual education). 
 255. James Crawford, Obituary: The Bilingual Education Act of 1968–2002 (2002), http:// 
ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/JWCRAWFORD/T7obit.htm. 
 256. Myhill, supra note 201, at 426. 
 257. Li, supra note 214, at 554. 
 258. 20 U.S.C. § 6812(1) (2006). 
 259. Id. §§ 6821–26. 
 260. Id. § 6812(9). 
 261. Flores v. Arizona, 516 F.3d 1140, 1173 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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civil right.”262  The EEOA is an equality-based civil rights statute, while 
NCLB is a program for overall, gradual school improvement.263  
“Compliance with the latter may well not satisfy the former.”264  “The 
EEOA’s concerns, in other words, lie fundamentally with the current 
rights of individual students, while NCLB seeks to gradually improve 
their schools.”265  NCLB does not supersede the EEOA because the 
EEOA provides an express cause of action, while NCLB does not.266  
The absence of remedies in NCLB leads courts to conclude that NCLB 
does not supersede the EEOA, but Congress could replace NCLB or 
insert a cause of action. 
Because of its focus on English acquisition, some commentators see 
Congress’s “incognito goal” in NCLB to squash federal support for 
bilingual education.267  These commentators believe that legislative 
initiatives to end bilingual education are unconstitutional or violative of 
the EEOA.268  While courts have held that the constitution neither 
requires nor prohibits bilingual and bicultural education, some argue that 
NCLB’s focus on English acquisition—and perceived distraction from 
bilingual education—not only violates the EEOA but also reaches 
unconstitutional levels under the Equal Protection Clause. 
C.  Rights of Schools and English-Only Rules 
Much has been written and discussed regarding English-only policies 
at the workplace.269  Whether a public school can require English to be 
spoken during school hours presents an intriguing legal question.  A 
recent Wichita, Kansas lawsuit provides an opportunity to explore some 
of the issues educational institutions face in shaping English-only 
policies during school hours.  The litigation also provides a context to 
expose uncertainties in constitutional, educational, and civil rights law. 
The case involved a private parochial middle school.  Although not a 
public school, much of the analysis should remain the same.  Early in the 
2007–2008 school year, St. Anne Catholic School required all students to 
                                                          
 262. 20 U.S.C. § 6847. 
 263. Flores, 516 F.3d at 1172. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 1173. 
 266. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 348 (1997). 
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 269. See generally infra Part VI. 
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speak English during school hours.270  Three sixth-grade students and 
their parents filed a complaint in federal court, alleging discrimination 
based on race, color, or national origin.271  The “plaintiffs claimed that 
St. Anne violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
by intentionally discriminating against the sixth-graders . . . causing a 
hostile educational environment.”272  St. Anne denied the allegations and 
asserted that the English-only rule was not discriminatory.273  St. Anne 
argued that the rule was “implemented as a legitimate and appropriate 
response to inappropriate behavior by a few [middle school] students.”274 
St. Anne asserted that the case did not implicate constitutional or 
statutory rights, as no court has recognized a right to speak a foreign 
language at school.275  Classes at St. Anne are conducted in English and 
the three plaintiffs spoke fluent English.276  Because all three sixth-grade 
plaintiffs spoke English fluently, St. Anne claimed they were not 
deprived of access to any educational benefit or opportunity enjoyed by 
others; they were fully able to communicate with others, to give and take 
direction from others, and to learn in a safe environment.277  The court 
found for St. Anne after a one-week bench trial. 
There is no constitutional or statutory entitlement for native English 
speakers to speak a foreign language during school hours.  In Rubio v. 
Turner Unified School District No. 202, a federal court stated that it was 
“not aware” of “any case (Supreme Court, Tenth Circuit or otherwise) 
which establishes a right to speak a foreign language at a public 
school.”278  St. Anne was fortunate that all three student plaintiffs spoke 
English fluently.  Had there been no alternative language of 
communication (other than Spanish), the case against St. Anne would 
have been much stronger.  A school should be advised to have legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons for requiring students to speak solely in 
English.  Without such reasons, the rule can appear hostile and 
discriminatory.  Reasonable excuses for an English-only rule might 
include issues of safety, the ability of teachers to understand students, 
and the promotion of unity and fellowship among students.  Courts often 
                                                          
 270. Silva v. St. Anne Catholic Sch., No. 08-1143-JTM, 2009 WL 89867, at *1 (D. Kan. Jan. 13, 
2009). 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. at *10. 
 276. Id. at *1–2. 
 277. Id. at *11. 
 278. Rubio v. Turner Unified Sch. Dist. No. 202, 453 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1305 (D. Kan. 2006). 
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use the Title VII proof scheme for Title VI and § 1981 claims of 
intentional discrimination.279 
D. Conclusion 
Because immigrant students have the “added obstacle of learning a 
new language while obtaining a meaningful educational experience,”280 
their advocates have sought refuge in courts and in the legislature.  
Undoubtedly, the education of the limited English-speaking student 
population presents a pressing issue for educators, judges, and 
lawmakers.  With the enactment of NCLB, advocates of bilingual 
education have an extra obstacle because of diminished federal funding 
for bilingual endeavors.  States are in the best position to make decisions 
affecting the education of English-language-learning students.  As long 
as states are making reasonable accommodations to English-language 
learners and are providing a meaningful and equal education to all 
students, the public education system satisfies its duties both under 
current constitutional precedents and federal legislation. 
V. LANGUAGE AND JURY SERVICE 
A.  Introduction and Background 
The “phenomenon of bilingual courtrooms” has caused legal 
problems of varying degrees and in varying forms.281  Language 
interpreters are utilized in federal and state courts much more often today 
than even a decade ago.282  “[T]o provide meaningful access to justice, 
many court proceedings require interpretation of multiple languages in 
order to be comprehensible to all of the participants . . . .”283  Such 
interpretation enables a non-English speaking witness or party to testify 
in front of an English-speaking judge and jury.  It is not difficult to see 
how a jury composed of jurors with limited English proficiency could 
produce a deficient verdict in civil or criminal cases.  A defendant has 
the right to a jury that understands the proceedings.  This section of the 
                                                          
 279. See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 584, 586 (1983) 
(holding that proof of discriminatory intent is not necessary to establish a Title VI violation, at least 
for injunctive relief, and that Title VII disparate impact analysis is appropriate to Title VI claims). 
 280. Li, supra note 214, at 540. 
 281. See Marina Hsieh, “Language-Qualifying” Juries to Exclude Bilingual Speakers, 66 
BROOK. L. REV. 1181, 1181–82 (2001) (discussing the challenges of bilingualism in courts). 
 282. Id. at 1182–83. 
 283. Id. at 1183. 
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survey will address the issues surrounding the statutory requirement that 
jurors possess a certain amount of English fluency.  It will also touch on 
the authority of attorneys to strike jurors for a perceived lack of English 
competency and how such authority can be abused.  This section 
concludes with a discussion of one unique fact pattern that permits 
attorneys to strike bilingual jurors. 
Under the Sixth Amendment, all federal criminal litigants are 
entitled to trial by juries “selected at random from a fair cross section of 
the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes.”284  
The Supreme Court has recognized “a right to a jury composed of 
persons selected from a fair cross section of society” as a fundamental 
right.285  If non-English speakers are prohibited from serving on juries 
because of an inability to understand English, the question arises: are 
juries really adequate reflections of a fair cross section of the 
community?  In most cases, the criminal defendant asserts that race-
based exclusions of a juror violate his or her rights, but there is also a 
right of members of the community to serve on juries and not be 
excluded from them. 
In Taylor v. Louisiana,286 the Supreme Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial includes a requirement that “jury wheels, 
pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not 
systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby 
fail to be reasonably representative thereof.”287  In Duren v. Missouri,288 
the Court clarified the right: 
In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section 
requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be 
excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the 
representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is 
not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the 
community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic 
exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.289 
 
                                                          
 284. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 529 (1975) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970)). 
 285. See Stephen E. Reil, Comment, Who Gets Counted? Jury List Representativeness for 
Hispanics in Areas with Growing Hispanic Populations Under Duren v. Missouri, 2007 BYU L. 
REV. 201, 257 (arguing that this ideal “has gone largely unrealized” at least partly because of faulty 
data used to create the fair cross section). 
 286. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
 287. Id. at 538. 
 288. 439 U.S. 357 (1979). 
 289. Id. at 364. 
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Even if a defendant establishes a prima facie case, no constitutional 
violation has occurred if the challenged exclusion serves “a significant 
[government] interest [that is] manifestly and primarily advanced by 
those aspects of the jury-selection process, such as exemption criteria, 
that result in the disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive group.”290 
In the seminal case of Batson v. Kentucky,291 the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the notion that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment forbids a “prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on 
account of their race . . . .”292  Batson is consistent with other cases 
striking down racially prejudicial behavior.  The more significant feature 
of Batson is what it said about proof of discriminatory intent.  Before 
Batson, a challenger could not rely on statistical discrepancy to establish 
a prima facie case without some direct proof of intent.  But under the 
Batson burden shifting formula, which resembles Title VII claims, this 
has changed.293  A key issue in Batson cases is whether it is a race-
neutral explanation to say that jurors do not speak English.  The line 
between language ability and race or national origin is hazy. 
The question of whether language can be equated with race or 
national origin has received substantial attention in federal courts.294  No 
consensus has been reached.  One decision used national origin and 
language interchangeably;295 another noted that language may be an 
“immutable characteristic” worthy of protection;296 yet another 
recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment protects groups of persons 
discriminated against because of linguistic characteristics.297  In some 
instances, language may be used as a pretext for racial discrimination.  It 
is not hard to imagine a prospective juror being ostensibly removed for  
 
                                                          
 290. Id. at 367–68. 
 291. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 292. Id. at 89.  The Court has applied the same analysis to forbid discrimination against 
individuals on the basis of gender.  See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (noting that 
“the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender”). 
 293. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97–98 (stating that once the defendant makes a prima facie 
showing, the State has the burden of showing “a neutral explanation related to the particular case to 
be tried”). 
 294. See generally Andrew P. Averbach, Note, Language Classifications and the Equal 
Protection Clause: When is Language a Pretext for Race or Ethnicity?, 74 B.U. L. REV. 481 (1994) 
(discussing the relationship between language, race, and ethnicity in the context of the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
 295. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 92 n.5 (1973) (“There is no suggestion . . . 
the company refused to hire aliens of Mexican or Spanish-speaking background while hiring those of 
other national origins.”). 
 296. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980) (dictum). 
 297. United States v. Uvalde Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 625 F.2d 547, 553 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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lack of English proficiency when race is the motivation for the juror’s 
exclusion. 
“Most courts have concluded that language classifications do not 
require heightened scrutiny.”298  This means that under the Equal 
Protection Clause, attorneys may potentially “strike bilingual persons 
from juries.”299  The “paradox is that language spoken does not fall 
within the protections of a Constitutional equal protection analysis, 
which may permissibly lead to racial discrimination.”300  Attorneys may 
be striking jurors based on race while using language as a pretext. 
B.  The Federal Jury Act and Comparable State Laws 
The Federal Jury Act provides that “[a] district court judge . . . shall 
deem any person qualified to serve on grand and petit juries in the 
district court unless he . . . is unable to read, write and understand the 
English language with a degree of proficiency sufficient to fill out 
satisfactorily the juror qualification form [or] is unable to speak the 
English language.”301  The statute places the burden of determining a 
juror’s fluency on the judge.302  A requirement of English proficiency 
prior to service on a jury is justified by the “‘overwhelming national 
interest served by the use of English in a United States court.’”303  One 
federal court applying the statute reasoned that “it is important that each 
juror be able to communicate verbally with the other jurors during 
deliberations . . . .  To have one or more of them linguistically cordoned 
off from the debate would tend to cause some unacceptable attrition in 
the right to trial by jury . . . .”304  Federal courts have consistently upheld 
the constitutionality of the Federal Jury Act, reasoning that the Act is 
subject to rational basis review.305  Many states have statutes equivalent 
                                                          
 298. Colin A. Kisor, Using Interpreters to Assist Jurors: A Plea for Consistency, 22 CHICANO-
LATINO L. REV. 37, 46 (2001). 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at 47. 
 301. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (2000).  The statute also requires the juror to be a U.S. citizen; be at 
least eighteen years old; have resided for a one-year period within the judicial district; not be 
incapable, by reason of mental or physical infirmity, to render satisfactory jury service; to not have a 
charge pending against him for the commission of, or to not have been convicted of a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.  Id. 
 302. Id. § 1865(a). 
 303. United States v. González-Vélez, 466 F.3d 27, 40 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. 
Aponte-Suárez, 905 F.2d 483, 492 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
 304. United States v. McDade, 929 F. Supp. 815, 817 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 305. See, e.g., United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993) (“The constitutionality 
of § 1865(b) is subject to rational basis review.”). 
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to the federal statute.306  In fact, all states except New Mexico include 
English proficiency as a qualification for jury service.307 
There are several considerations offered to justify a requirement that 
jurors possess proficiency in English.  First, English is the language of 
the court proceedings and the secret jury room deliberations.  Some 
assert that an English proficiency requirement operates to exclude all 
persons who only speak Spanish.  Assuming that persons who only speak 
Spanish constitute a “distinctive” group for purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment fair cross-section requirement, an English proficiency 
requirement is nonetheless constitutional because it manifestly advances 
significant government interests and is narrowly tailored.  If jurors do not 
speak a common language, they cannot communicate among themselves, 
and communication is essential if jurors are to perform their deliberative 
function. 
Next, English-speaking jurors are necessary to maintain the order 
and dignity of jury service.  Some assert that an English proficiency 
requirement violates the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth 
Amendment.  However, many cities in the United States contain several 
different groups that are unable to speak English and that speak another 
language exclusively.  If the jury venire must include all such groups in 
order to ensure that the jury pool includes a fair cross-section of the 
community, some chosen juries would likely require multiple translators.  
A jury composed in that way could probably not engage in the secret, 
deliberative process historically associated with a petit jury. 
Yet another purpose for an English proficiency requirement is that 
translators are not allowed in the jury deliberation rooms.  The use of 
translators could ensure effective communication among jurors who 
speak different languages; translators are commonly used in courtrooms 
to interpret party or witness testimony from a language other than 
English.  Yet the Supreme Court has recognized that the presence of non-
jurors in the jury room during deliberations “contravene[s] ‘the cardinal 
principle that the deliberations of the jury shall remain private and 
                                                          
 306. See DeLong v. Brumbaugh, 703 F. Supp. 399, 402 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (discussing 
Pennsylvania’s jury qualification law); see also ALA. CODE § 12-16-60(a)(2) (2006) (prospective 
juror must be “able to read, speak, understand and follow instructions given by a judge in the 
English language”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:20-1(b) (West 2008) (juror must “read and understand the 
English language”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-3 (West 2000) (juror must be able to “hear and 
understand the English language”); McDade, 929 F. Supp. at 817 (allowing the voir dire question: 
“Do you have any difficulty reading or understanding the English language?”). 
 307. G. Thomas Munsterman, Jury News, ¿ No Se Habla Jury Duty?, 2003, CT. MANAGER at 29, 
30, available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_Juries_JuryNewsEngHispRep 
Pub.pdf. 
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secret.’”308  Having a non-juror in the jury room also creates a serious 
risk that the course of deliberations will be influenced in ways that would 
be impossible to detect.309 
Finally, running court proceedings in English preserves the 
uniformity federal courts seek.  As the First Circuit has observed, 
“[f]ederal district courts in part are designed to provide trial alternatives 
for litigants, resident and nonresident, who seek the uniformity, 
expertise, and familiarity that they believe they may find in a national 
rather than a local forum.”310  An English proficiency requirement “is 
both symbolically and functionally significant in achieving this goal.”311 
An English proficiency requirement “is the most subjective of all of 
the jury service qualifications.”312  “The others—U.S. citizenship, 
residency, age, and felony conviction status—are well-defined.”313  
When filling out the juror qualification questionnaire, prospective jurors 
mark either “yes” or “no” to each question.314  Courts vary greatly as to 
how they evaluate the English proficiency of a prospective juror.  Some 
courts presume that a prospective juror “who completes the qualification 
questionnaire understands English sufficiently for qualification 
purposes.”315  Other courts use a jury staff to screen the language 
proficiency of prospective jurors.316  Any quick attempt to screen and 
judge a prospective juror’s language fluency will fall short of giving a 
true picture of the person’s abilities. 
Several problems can arise by virtue of the flawed screening 
processes.  First, “if the language screening process is over-inclusive—
that is, if it is designed to include prospective jurors whose English 
proficiency is only marginal,” then jurors who do not understand the 
proceedings will be included.317  The judge, if he or she catches the error, 
can excuse individuals who do not belong on the jury: 
                                                          
 308. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 737 (1993) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b) advisory 
committee’s notes) (noting the effect of alternate jurors in the juror room). 
 309. See id. at 742 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding it “most difficult . . . to show the absence 
of prejudice” from the presence of a thirteenth person in the jury room, because of “certain premises 
about group dynamics that make it difficult for us to know how the jury’s deliberations may [be] 
affected”). 
 310. United States v. Benmuhar, 658 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 1981). 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Munsterman, supra note 307, at 30. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
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Judges may be able to screen more realistically because the expected 
level of trial complexity is generally better known at voir dire than at 
jury qualification.  The risk of a juror having difficulty in 
understanding the testimony in the middle of a trial prompts judges to 
err on the side of increased proficiency.318 
On the other hand, a jury should be a reflection of one’s peers.  If a 
judge uses a screening process that “is designed to disqualify Spanish-
speaking (or other non-English speaking) [people] unless they [have 
fluent English abilities], then the jury panel appears to be less 
representative of the Hispanic population in the community than actually 
exists.”319  Such a case would be ripe for a “fair cross section” challenge 
under the Sixth Amendment.  Striking a balance between a jury that 
understands English well enough to grasp the trial proceedings, on the 
one hand, and a jury that fairly represents society, on the other, is a 
process that varies in complexity by region. 
C. Special Case in Which Bilingual Jurors May Be Constitutionally 
Struck 
Consider the case where a potential juror is bilingual with English 
and Spanish fluency; the trial will include in-court testimony given in 
Spanish and translated into English by an interpreter.  An attorney 
believes that the potential juror will not be able to focus solely on the 
English interpretation, but instead will listen to the Spanish testimony.  
The attorney wants to dismiss the potential juror from the pool. 
Under Hernandez v. New York,320 lawyers may legitimately exclude 
bilingual jurors because they might listen to non-English testimony, not 
the court’s official testimony in English.321  In Hernandez, prosecutors 
were allowed to strike potential jurors based on fluency in another 
language without violating Batson v. Kentucky because language and 
race, in this particular instance, could be distinguished.322  The 
prosecutor in Hernandez admitted “that he struck two prospective jurors 
who were bilingual in Spanish and English because he was uncertain 
they would listen to and follow the English interpreter during testimony 
                                                          
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
 320. 500 U.S. 352 (1991). 
 321. See Kisor, supra note 298, at 45 (noting how the United States Supreme Court denied a 
defendant’s equal protection challenge of the use of peremptory challenges to exclude bilingual 
jurors). 
 322. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 370–72 (noting that the prosecutor “offered a race-neutral basis 
for his exercise of peremptory challenges”). 
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in Spanish.”323  Hernandez noted the possibility that language may be a 
surrogate for race under an equal protection analysis.324  Circuit courts 
have followed Hernandez, accepting an ability to understand original, 
non-English testimony of a witness as a legitimate, non race-based 
reason for a peremptory strike of a juror.325 
Hernandez has also been followed in state courts.  For instance, the 
Texas Court of Appeals refused to overturn the conviction of a Spanish-
speaking defendant where the prosecutor struck all the potential jurors 
who spoke Spanish.  The prosecutor explained: “‘Based on my past 
experience in trying cases where there are interpreters involved, [the 
jurors] will not follow the official version of the interpreter.’”326  
However, in part because the prosecutor also struck two Caucasians who 
spoke Spanish, the court rejected the defendant’s Batson challenge and 
found the prosecutor’s actions to be race-neutral.327 
D. Conclusion 
Jury service is another context in which separation of race from 
language is vital because of the Constitution and federal laws.  Attorneys 
must exercise caution when striking jurors for perceived inability to 
understand English at a necessary level.  Striking a juror might trigger 
claims of race discrimination by the stricken juror or Sixth Amendment 
“fair cross section” claims by the criminal defendant.  Not striking a 
juror, on the other hand, might lead to claims of an unfair trial if the juror 
did not possess sufficient English competency. 
 
 
                                                          
 323. Id. at 356–57. 
 324. See id. at 371–72 (stating this did not resolve “the breadth with which the concept of race 
should be defined”). 
 325. See Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding the Equal Protection Clause 
does not prohibit attorneys from peremptory challenges of bilingual jurors when their ability will 
allow them to understand a translation at dispute in the trial); United States v. Munoz, 15 F.3d 395 
(5th Cir. 1994) (noting peremptory challenges of bilingual jurors is reasonable when the challenge is 
race neutral and tied to the particular circumstances of the case). 
 326. Chavarria v. Texas, No. 05-98-0595-CR, 2000 WL 567072, at *6 (Tex. App. May 9, 2000). 
 327. See id. at *6, *15; see also Kisor, supra note 298, at 45 (noting the dismissal of two 
Caucasian Spanish-speaking jurors in addition to a Hispanic Spanish-speaking juror was relevant to 
the court finding the actions race-neutral). 
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VI. LANGUAGE REGULATION IN THE WORKPLACE 
A. Introduction and Background 
Since 1980, policies prohibiting the use of languages other than 
English in the workplace (workplace English-only policies) have 
spawned significant litigation.328  While claims under Title VII are by far 
the most common,329 English-only employment litigation has recently 
expanded into other areas of federal and constitutional law.330  Plaintiffs 
commonly argue that workplace English-only policies are discriminatory 
in violation of Title VII and § 1981.  Federal courts of appeals also 
recently considered, in a case of first impression, whether workplace 
English-only policies may violate the First Amendment.331  This section 
provides a summary of the caselaw and regulations that bear on whether 
workplace English-only policies violate federal law.  Due to the 
relatively unsettled nature of these cases, it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to provide definitive answers to the issues that arise in English-only 
employment litigation.  Nevertheless, this section provides a general 
overview of the issues that confront employees and employers in 
English-only employment litigation.  In assessing the legality of a 
workplace English-only policy, courts may consider, inter alia, the 
effects the policy has on employees, the breadth of the policy, the 
employer’s motivation for the policy, and whether business necessities 
justify the policy.  Consequently, employers must fully consider the legal 
implications of adopting a workplace English-only policy. 
B. Federal and Constitutional Laws Bearing on the Legality of English-
Only Policies 
Although the United States has long been a melting pot of 
nationalities and cultures, neither the Constitution nor any federal law 
directly proscribes language discrimination.332  Indeed, federal laws 
                                                          
 328. See HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 
AND PRACTICE 81 (2d ed. 2004) (stating that between 1996 and 2000, EEOC charges against 
workplace English-only policies quintupled). 
 329. Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Requirement that Employees Speak English in 
Workplace as Violative of Federal Constitutional and Statutory Law, 24 A.L.R. FED. 2d 587 (2007). 
 330. See, e.g., Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1298 (10th Cir. 2006) (challenging a 
public workplace English-only policy as a violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
 331. Id. at 1309. 
 332. See Julie Thorpe-Lopez, America’s Melting Pot: Language Not Included. U.S. Workplace 
Language Discrimination and the European Union Approach as a Model Framework, 38 CAL. W. 
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bearing on the subject permit language discrimination—in the form of 
pre-hiring language competency or proficiency requirements—if 
necessary for effective job performance.333  Because language is not 
protected, plaintiffs must predicate discrimination claims against 
workplace English-only policies on violations of other federal laws 
which indirectly implicate language—such as those prohibiting 
discrimination or prohibiting restrictions on freedom of speech.  
Plaintiffs have therefore challenged the legality of workplace English-
only policies as national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as racial discrimination in violation of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1966, § 1981, and as a violation of the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.334  Workplace English-only 
policies may also implicate the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII 
and § 1981.335  The following sections first introduce the procedural 
frameworks that apply to the preceding theories of liability.  Following 
this introduction is a discussion of the issues that arise when these 
theories of liability are applied to workplace English-only policies. 
                                                                                                                       
INT’L L.J. 217, 232 (2007) (noting language is not a protected class under Title VII). 
 333. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000) (authorizing an employer to “hire and employ 
employees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where 
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the 
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise”). 
  Note, however, that the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification affirmative defense does not 
“excuse discrimination in post-hire terms and conditions of employment—compensation, promotion, 
discipline, harassment or discharge—or any discrimination on the basis of race.”  LEWIS & 
NORMAN, supra note 328, at 174; see also EEOC Compliance Manual, Section 13: National Origin 
Discrimination, No. 915.003, Dec. 2, 2002 (stating that language fluency requirements are 
permissible “only if required for the effective performance of the position for which it is imposed” 
and providing an example of a permissible refusal to hire due to lack of necessary language 
proficiency); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (discussing the need, under 
Title VII, to balance employee rights with employer prerogatives), superseded by statute, Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; Forsythe v. Bd. of Educ., 956 F. Supp. 
927, 932–33 (D. Kan. 1997) (citing Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir. 1993)) 
(stating that “language difficulties that interfere with performance of duties may be legitimately 
considered in employment decisions”); Cristina M. Rodríguez, Language Diversity in the 
Workplace, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1689, 1691 n.3 (2006) (stating that regarding the “English-only rule 
phenomenon, I am concerned not with the employer’s setting of English fluency or proficiency as a 
condition of employment in the first place—it would be an uphill battle to demonstrate that an 
English-language requirement, in the majority of cases, is anything but a legitimate job requirement, 
or a bona fide occupational qualification”).  But see Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 
1980) (stating that “[t]he refusal to hire applicants who cannot speak English might be 
discriminatory if the jobs they seek can be performed without knowledge of that language”). 
 334. See, e.g., Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1298; Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483; Gloor, 618 F.2d at 
266. 
 335. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1308. 
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C. Title VII Actions 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribes racial and 
national origin discrimination.  Under Title VII: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to 
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in 
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.336 
By its terms, Title VII prohibits employment policies that adversely 
affect an employee’s tangible job benefits or an employee’s “terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment”337 because of the employee’s 
national origin.338  There are two major theories of liability under which 
a plaintiff may bring a Title VII claim—disparate treatment theory and 
disparate impact theory.339  Plaintiffs may also bring Title VII claims 
under a hostile work environment theory.340  The following subsections 
first discuss the burden-shifting frameworks applicable to Title VII 
disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.  Following this 
discussion is an analysis of how courts have applied these burden-
shifting frameworks to Title VII claims challenging workplace English-
only policies.  The final subsection then discusses whether a workplace 
English-only policy may create a hostile work environment for bilingual 
employees of non-English speaking national origins. 
1. Disparate Treatment Theory 
Plaintiffs alleging a violation of Title VII based on disparate 
treatment typically cannot recover when the alleged disparate treatment 
results from the adoption of a workplace English-only policy.  A Title 
VII disparate treatment claim proceeds under the burden-shifting 
                                                          
 336. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). 
 337. Id. 
 338. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). 
 339. Mark Colón, Line Drawing, Code Switching, and Spanish as Second-Hand Smoke: English-
Only Workplace Rules and Bilingual Employees, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 232–33 (2002). 
 340. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
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framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.341  To 
establish a prima facie claim of disparate treatment, a plaintiff must 
prove (through direct or circumstantial evidence) that the employer’s 
adoption of the English-only policy was motivated by discriminatory 
intent.342  The burden then shifts to the employer to “articulate a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the employment policy.343  
After the employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
the policy, the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the policy 
is merely a pretext for discrimination.344 
Although language is intimately related to national origin, Title VII 
does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of language.345  A 
workplace English-only policy is therefore facially neutral because it 
does not discriminate based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”346  Plaintiffs may nevertheless establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination by presenting sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence 
that the employer’s adoption of the English-only policy was motivated 
by national origin-based animus.347  For example, some courts have held 
that workplace English-only policies which forbid the use of other 
languages at all times and make no exceptions provide sufficient 
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent to satisfy the plaintiff’s 
initial burden of proving disparate treatment.348  If, however, a plaintiff 
cannot proffer any evidence showing that the employer adopted the 
English-only policy with the intention of adversely affecting protected 
                                                          
 341. 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973). 
 342. See id. at 802; Colón, supra note 339, at 233; Rosanna McCalips, What Recent Court Cases 
Indicate About English-Only Rules in the Workplace: A Critical Look at the Need for a Supreme 
Court Ruling on the Issue, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 417, 418 (2002). 
 343. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. 
 344. Id. at 804. 
 345. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). 
 346. Colón, supra note 339, at 233; Thorpe-Lopez, supra note 332, at 231. 
 347. Colón, supra note 339, at 233. 
 348. In the context of workplace English-only policies, courts typically base an inference of 
national origin-based animus on the EEOC guidelines, which presume that English-only policies that 
apply at all times violate Title VII.  See, e.g., Barber v. Lovelace Sandia Health Sys., 409 F. Supp. 
2d 1313, 1335–36 (D.N.M. 2005) (assuming, for the purposes of summary judgment, that an 
English-only rule that applied at all times establishes a prima facie claim of disparate treatment); 
EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1076 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (holding that 
employees fired for noncompliance with English-only policy were entitled to recovery under Title 
VII).  The rationale for these holdings is similar to the rationale articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans.  517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).  In Romer, the Supreme Court struck 
down a state constitutional amendment that prohibited governmental action designed to protect 
homosexuals from discrimination.  Id. at 622.  The Court reasoned that the sheer breadth of the 
amendment was so misaligned with the reasons for the amendment that one must assume that the 
amendment was motivated by sexual orientation-based animus.  Id. at 632. 
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classes, the plaintiff will be unable to establish a prima facie case.349  
Consequently, narrowly-tailored English-only policies motivated solely 
by legitimate business reasons are unlikely to subject employers to 
liability under a disparate treatment theory.350  For this reason, most Title 
VII challenges to workplace English-only polices are brought under a 
disparate impact theory. 
2. Disparate Impact Theory 
Disparate impact claims challenging workplace English-only policies 
have been increasingly successful in recent years.351  Such disparate 
impact claims proceed under the three-step burden shifting framework 
established in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.352  According to the Griggs 
framework, the plaintiff must first establish that the employment policy 
in question has a disparate impact on members of a protected class.353  To 
establish a disparate impact, the plaintiff must prove that the policy has a 
significant, disproportionate, adverse impact on the “terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment” of a protected class.354  Although plaintiffs 
typically present statistical evidence to satisfy the initial burden, 
plaintiffs may also use more subjective, qualitative forms of evidence.355  
If the plaintiff satisfies his or her initial burden, the burden then shifts to 
the defendant employer to provide a business necessity for the policy.356  
The employer’s burden to justify the allegedly discriminatory policy with 
a business necessity is in the nature of an affirmative defense, which the 
employer may establish by presenting statistical reports, expert 
testimony, or prior successful experience that proves the discriminatory 
                                                          
 349. See Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1307–08 (10th Cir. 2006) (concluding that 
plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent to establish a prima facie disparate 
treatment claim). 
 350. See Montes v. Vail Clinic, Inc., 497 F.3d 1160, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007) (concluding a “policy 
applicable only at ‘certain times’ or places” is “justifiable on a showing of business necessity”). 
 351. Compare Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1316 (holding that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence 
that employer’s English-only policy created a hostile work environment to render summary 
judgment inappropriate), with Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that 
employees failed to establish that employer’s English-only policy caused a disparate impact in 
violation of Title VII). 
 352. 401 U.S. 424, 427–31 (1971); see also McCalips, supra note 342, at 418. 
 353. McCalips, supra note 342, at 419. 
 354. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 
F.2d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982)). 
 355. See Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1304–06 (explaining evidence of specific instances of “ethnic 
taunting as a result of the policy” was sufficient to satisfy the initial burden). 
 356. Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). 
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policy is, in fact, a business necessity.357  If the defendant establishes a 
business necessity, the plaintiff must then show that the business 
necessity could be achieved with a less discriminatory business policy.358 
Employees may premise disparate impact claims on adverse actions 
taken by employers against bilingual employees for violating a 
workplace English-only policy.  Employers, however, typically refrain 
from imposing tangible or quantitative punishments on employees for 
violations of English-only policies.359  Thus, employees often cannot 
point to specific adverse actions taken under the policy—like firings or 
demotions—and therefore claim that workplace English-only policies 
violate Title VII by adversely affecting the “terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment” or by creating a hostile work environment.  
Perhaps realizing that English-only plaintiffs often lack objective 
evidence of discrimination, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) issued a series of guidelines addressing the legality 
of workplace English-only policies.360  The following subsections 
discuss: (1) the EEOC guidelines on workplace English-only policies, (2) 
the general rejection of the EEOC’s guideline-based presumption by 
courts, (3) the consensus that English-only rules violate Title VII when 
applied to monolingual non-English speaking plaintiffs, and (4) the 
tendency of courts to dismiss generalized claims that English-only 
policies burden the “terms, conditions, or privileges” of non-English 
speaking employees’ employment in violation of Title VII. 
a. EEOC Guidelines on Workplace English-Only Policies 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 created the EEOC to eliminate 
discrimination in the workplace.361  Congress gave the EEOC the 
authority to issue, amend, and rescind guidelines to carry out the 
provisions of Title VII.362  Concerned about potential abuse of English-
only policies by employers, the EEOC established guidelines governing 
                                                          
 357. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431–32 (1971); Melissa Meitus, English-Only 
Policies in the Workplace: Disparate Impact Compared to the EEOC Guidelines, 84 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 901, 905 (2007). 
 358. McCalips, supra note 342, at 419. 
 359. Perhaps the lack of quantitative punishments for violations of English-only policies is itself 
evidence that the English-only policy is not justified by business necessity.  See generally 
Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1306. 
 360. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993); see also EEOC Directives 
Transmittal, No. 915.003 (Dec. 2, 2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/national-
origin.html#VB1. 
 361. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (2000). 
 362. Id. § 2000e-12(a). 
07 0_ASSOCIATE EDITOR FINAL 3/8/2009  5:00:43 PM 
720 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
English-only policies in the workplace.363  According to these guidelines, 
English-only policies that require “employees to speak only English at all 
times in the workplace [constitute] a burdensome term and condition of 
employment” which by prohibiting employees from speaking their 
primary language “disadvantages an individual’s employment 
opportunities on the basis of national origin.”364  The EEOC therefore 
concluded that blanket English-only policies are presumed to violate 
Title VII—thereby establishing plaintiff’s prima facie case—because 
such policies “create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and 
intimidation based on national origin.”365 
The EEOC took a more moderate position on English-only policies 
that apply only during specified times.  Rather than applying a 
presumption of a Title VII violation, EEOC guidelines state that 
employers may use limited English-only policies if they are “justified by 
business necessity.”366  While the EEOC does not consider limited 
English-only policies inherently violative of Title VII, the EEOC does 
presume that the mere existence of a blanket or limited English-only 
policy will establish the plaintiff’s prima facie case.367  The EEOC 
considers it evidence of discrimination if an employer fails to give notice 
to its employees of an English-only policy but nevertheless takes adverse 
employment action against an individual for violating the policy.368  
Despite the outright rejection of these guidelines by some courts,369 the 
EEOC considers claims of discrimination involving language issues an 
enforcement priority.370  In 2007, the EEOC received 190 charges of 
national origin discrimination based on workplace English-only policies 
and sued based on two such charges.371  Consequently, both employees 
and employers should be aware that the EEOC guidelines play an  
 
                                                          
 363. See EEOC Directives Transmittal, supra note 360. 
 364. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2008). 
 365. Id.; see also Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489 (“The EEOC Guidelines provide that an 
employee meets the prima facie case in a disparate impact cause of action merely by proving the 
existence of the English-only policy.”); Long v. First Union Corp., 894 F. Supp. 933, 940 (E.D. Va. 
1995) (same). 
 366. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(b). 
 367. LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 328, at 81 (“Even if the rule is limited to certain times, the 
EEOC guideline . . . gives it the same prima facie effect . . . .”). 
 368. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(c). 
 369. See, e.g., Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489. 
 370. See Press Release, EEOC, Court Speaks: English Only Rule Unlawful; Awards EEOC 
$700,000 for Hispanic Workers (Sept. 19, 2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/9-19-
00.html. 
 371. EEOC Settles Salvation Army Suit That Challenged English-Only Rules, 217 Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) A-1 (Nov. 17, 2008). 
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important role in defining their respective rights and liabilities with 
regard to workplace English-only policies.372 
b. Courts Generally Disregard the EEOC’s Presumption of a Disparate 
Impact 
Courts generally agree that plaintiffs may not establish a prima facie 
disparate impact claim by merely proving the existence of a workplace 
English-only policy.  Instead, courts typically require plaintiffs to prove 
the adverse impact of a workplace English-only policy.373  The EEOC 
guidelines, however, suggest that an employee may establish a prima 
facie disparate impact claim by merely proving the existence of a 
workplace English-only policy.374  According to the EEOC guidelines, a 
defendant employer must always prove that its English-only policy is 
supported by business necessity.375  Noting that the EEOC guidelines 
contravene Supreme Court precedent—not to mention the language of 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)—the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the EEOC 
guidelines.376 
Most courts agree with the Ninth Circuit and reject the EEOC’s 
presumption that the mere existence of an English-only policy will 
establish a prima facie disparate impact claim.377  These courts reason 
that presuming a prima facie disparate impact—pursuant to the EEOC 
guidelines—contravenes the burden-shifting framework established by 
                                                          
 372. Although courts have disagreed on whether to defer to the EEOC guidelines, Congress 
specifically discussed the EEOC English-only guidelines in 1991 when it considered other 
amendments to Title VII and ultimately decided to leave the EEOC guidelines intact.  EEOC v. 
Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1074 (N.D. Tex. 2000). 
 373. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489 (rejecting the EEOC guidelines); Kania v. Archdiocese of 
Phila., 14 F. Supp. 2d 730, 735–36 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (same); Tran v. Standard Motor Prods., Inc., 10 
F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1211 (D. Kan. 1998) (rejecting, without discussion, the EEOC’s presumption); 
Long v. First Union Corp., 894 F. Supp. 933, 940 (E.D. Va. 1995) (rejecting the EEOC’s 
presumption); EEOC v. Beauty Enters., Inc., No. 3:01CV378 (AHN), 2005 WL 2764822, at *11 (D. 
Conn. Oct. 25, 2005) (same); see also LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 328, at 82 (“The Ninth 
Circuit . . . insisted that adverse impact must be proved and not merely presumed.”).  But cf. EEOC 
v. Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 915 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (following the EEOC’s 
English-only regulatory framework). 
 374. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489 (stating that the “EEOC Guidelines provide that an employee 
meets the prima facie case in a disparate impact cause of action merely by proving the existence of 
the English-only policy”); Long, 894 F. Supp. at 940 (same). 
 375. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489. 
 376. Id. at 1489–90. 
 377. See, e.g., Tran, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1211 (rejecting, without discussion, the EEOC’s 
presumption that the mere existence of a workplace English-only policy establishes a prima facie 
disparate impact claim); Beauty Enters., 2005 WL 2764822, at *11–12 (rejecting EEOC 
presumption).  But cf. Synchro-Start Prods., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 915 (following the EEOC’s English-
only regulatory framework). 
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the Supreme Court and codified by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).378  Although 
the Tenth Circuit refused to address the validity of the EEOC’s 
presumption, its analysis suggests that a plaintiff must present some 
evidence of an adverse impact—besides the mere existence of an 
English-only policy—to establish a prima facie disparate impact claim.379  
A prima facie disparate impact claim typically requires the plaintiff to 
prove both (1) a significant, adverse impact on the terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment of a protected class and (2) “that the employee 
population in general is not affected by the policy to the same degree.”380  
Therefore, except in exceptional circumstances—such as when the 
plaintiff cannot speak any English or the policy is overly-broad—a 
plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie disparate impact claim by merely 
proving the existence of a workplace English-only policy. 
c. Workplace English-Only Policies Have a Disparate Impact on Non-
English Speaking Employees in Violation of Title VII 
Although circuits disagree on whether English-only policies have 
significant adverse effects on bilingual plaintiffs, courts and the EEOC 
agree that a workplace English-only policy imposed against a 
monolingual, non-English speaking employee violates Title VII.381  
These courts reason that an English-only policy applied against a 
monolingual, non-English speaking employee prevents the employee 
from communicating, and thus, the English-only policy may have an 
adverse impact in violation of Title VII.382  As discussed, pre-hiring 
English proficiency or competency requirements are generally 
permissible if necessary for effective job performance.  Pre-hiring 
English proficiency requirements are therefore less likely to result in a 
Title VII discrimination complaint.  Consequently, employers should 
consider language proficiency qualifications before hiring an employee 
because the adoption of a post-hiring English-only policy—as applied to 
monolingual non-English speaking employees—could be construed as 
disparate impact discrimination. 
 
                                                          
 378. See, e.g., Beauty Enters., 2005 WL 2764822, at *9. 
 379. See Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1304–06 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 380. Beauty Enters., 2005 WL 2764822, at *11 (citing Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486). 
 381. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1488; Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980); 
Synchro-Start Prods., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 915; 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2008). 
 382. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1488; Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270. 
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d. Discrimination in the Terms, Conditions, and Privileges of 
Employment 
Courts typically reject the claim that workplace English-only policies 
have a significant, adverse impact on the “terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment” of employees of non-English speaking national origins.  
The Fifth Circuit first addressed whether an employer’s English-only 
policy constituted a discriminatory condition of employment.383  It held 
that Title VII neither confers substantive privileges nor forbids policies 
that employees can observe as a matter of choice, and therefore, the 
defendant employer did not violate Title VII by denying the plaintiff the 
privilege to speak his preferred language.384  In Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 
the plaintiff similarly argued before the Ninth Circuit that the employer’s 
English-only policy had an unlawful disparate impact on the terms, 
conditions, and privileges of employment because it denied Hispanic 
employees (1) the right to cultural expression and (2) the right to speak 
in their preferred language—Spanish.385  The Ninth Circuit rejected the 
plaintiffs’ first argument, concluding that because Title VII does not 
confer substantive privileges—such as the right to self-expression—the 
employer did not violate Title VII.386  The Ninth Circuit also rejected the 
plaintiffs’ second argument, reasoning that although the English-only 
policy disproportionately impacted Hispanic employees by preventing 
them from speaking their native language, this impact did not constitute a 
significant denial of an employment privilege given the ability of 
bilingual Hispanic employees to speak English.387 
The holdings of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits are representative of the 
holdings of district court cases in which plaintiffs allege that English-
only policies have a disparate impact on the terms, conditions, or 
privileges of their employment in violation of Title VII.388  Only a small 
minority of courts heed the EEOC guidelines.389  Accordingly, employee 
claims that English-only policies adversely affect the terms, conditions, 
and privileges of employment are not often successful because the 
                                                          
 383. Gloor, 618 F.2d at 267. 
 384. Id. at 270–71. 
 385. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486–87. 
 386. Id. at 1487. 
 387. Id. at 1487–88. 
 388. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sephora USA, L.L.C., 419 F. Supp. 2d 408, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Long 
v. First Union Corp., 894 F. Supp. 933, 941 (E.D. Va. 1995). 
 389. See, e.g., EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1073–75 (N.D. 
Tex. 2000) (following the EEOC guidelines); EEOC v. Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 
911, 915 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (same). 
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adverse effects are typically not sufficiently severe to establish the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case.  Nevertheless, a workplace policy that 
significantly burdens an employee’s terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment—such as a policy that creates a hostile work environment—
will likely violate Title VII. 
3. Hostile Work Environment Claims Predicated on Workplace 
English-Only Policies 
Recent Tenth Circuit caselaw suggests that workplace English-only 
rules may create a hostile work environment for bilingual employees of 
non-English speaking national origins.  Title VII prohibits national origin 
discrimination that adversely affects the terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment.390  Discrimination against an individual with respect to 
the terms and conditions of employment “is not limited to ‘economic’ or 
‘tangible’ discrimination, . . . it covers more than ‘terms’ and 
‘conditions’ in the narrow contractual sense.”391  A work environment is 
deemed hostile and in violation of Title VII where it is “sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment 
and create an abusive working environment.”392  To establish a prima 
facie hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must prove that his or 
her workplace was, under the totality of the circumstances, objectively 
and subjectively hostile to members of the protected class.393 
Courts and scholars disagree whether plaintiffs may predicate a 
hostile work environment claim on disparate impact theory.394  Plaintiffs 
generally predicate hostile work environment claims on intentional 
discrimination, and thus, hostile work environment claims generally 
proceed under disparate treatment theory.395  Recent challenges to 
workplace English-only policies, however, suggest that a plaintiff may 
predicate a hostile work environment claim—in the context of a 
workplace English-only policy—on either disparate treatment theory or 
disparate impact theory.396  Hostile work environment claims under 
                                                          
 390. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). 
 391. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115–16 (2002) (citations omitted). 
 392. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
 393. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787–88 (1998). 
 394. See L. Camille Hébert, The Disparate Impact of Sexual Harassment: Does Motive Matter?, 
53 U. KAN. L. REV. 341, 357–58 (2005) (“[C]ourts have suggested from time to time that hostile 
work environment claims are akin to claims of disparate impact, asserting it is the effect on the 
victim, not the defendant’s motivation, that gives rise to a claim.”). 
 395. Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1304 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 396. Id.; Montes v. Vail Clinic, Inc., 497 F.3d 1160, 1168 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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disparate treatment theory require proof that the English-only policy was 
motivated by discriminatory intent.397  Hostile work environment claims 
under disparate impact theory, in contrast, require proof that the English-
only policy disproportionately impacted individuals of non-English-
speaking national origins.398  Although disparate impact theory and 
disparate treatment theory employ different burden-shifting frameworks, 
recent caselaw suggests that the success or failure of hostile work 
environment claims under either theory hinges on two related issues.399  
The first issue is whether the plaintiff can establish—as part of her prima 
facie case—an objectively hostile work environment.400  The second 
issue is whether the English-only policy is narrowly-tailored to business 
necessities.401  The following discussion highlights the significance of 
these interrelated issues to hostile work environment claims. 
Courts generally agree that a plaintiff must present some evidence 
beyond the mere existence of a narrowly-tailored English-only policy to 
establish a prima facie hostile work environment.402  Bilingual plaintiffs 
often argue that English-only policies contribute to a hostile work 
environment because bilingual employees must work in constant fear 
that a slip of the tongue could expose them to sanctions.  The Fifth 
Circuit, in Garcia v. Gloor, held that a workplace English-only policy 
cannot have a disparate impact on bilingual employees because, for 
them, compliance with an English-only policy is a matter of choice—a 
matter of exercising a mutable characteristic.403  Recent psycho-linguistic 
studies, however, suggest that language use is not solely a matter of 
preference, but rather, that bilingual individuals unconsciously revert—
because of a phenomenon known as “code switching”—to speaking in 
their native tongue.404  Code switching makes compliance with 
workplace English-only policies more difficult for bilingual employees 
                                                          
 397. Montes, 497 F.3d at 1170 n.15; Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1307–08. 
 398. See Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1303–04 (“[A] disparate-impact claim does not require a 
showing of discriminatory intent.”). 
 399. See, e.g., id. at 1304 (“The allocation of the burdens of proof in disparate-impact cases . . . 
is more rigorous than in a disparate treatment case because a plaintiff must not merely show 
circumstances raising an inference of discriminatory impact but must demonstrate the discriminatory 
impact at issue.”); see also EEOC v. Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 912 (N.D. Ill. 
1999). 
 400. See, e.g., Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1304–06. 
 401. See, e.g., id. at 1306–07. 
 402. Compare Synchro-Start Prods., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 912–15 (deferring to the EEOC 
guidelines), with Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489–90 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the 
EEOC guidelines). 
 403. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Colón, supra note 339, at 238–
39. 
 404. McCalips, supra note 342, at 431. 
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than for monolingual employees, and thus, bilingual employees—who 
often share a particular non-English speaking national origin—run a 
greater risk of discipline for violating the policy.405  These studies 
undermine the Fifth Circuit’s analysis and support recent court decisions 
acknowledging the difficulty bilingual employees have complying with 
workplace English-only policies.406 
Nevertheless, the mere existence of an English-only policy, standing 
alone, does not establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim.407  
The Tenth Circuit held, in Maldonado v. City of Altus, that the plaintiff 
raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer’s 
English-only policy created a hostile work environment for Hispanic 
employees.408  The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the EEOC guidelines, 
combined with other evidence of discrimination, suggest that reasonable 
jurors could conclude that the employer’s blanket English-only policy 
created a prima facie hostile work environment.409  The hostility of a 
work environment is determined under the totality of the 
circumstances.410  Thus, courts consider the circumstances surrounding 
the enactment of the English-only policy, the effects of the policy, the 
justifications for the policy, and the scope of the policy to determine 
whether the policy creates a hostile work environment.411  A plaintiff 
may support a prima facie hostile work environment claim with evidence 
that the employer lacked business reasons for the policy,412 that the 
policy was over-inclusive,413 that ethnic taunting accompanied the 
policy,414 or that bilingual employees reasonably feared discipline for 
inadvertently violating the policy.415 
Following its decision in Maldonado, the Tenth Circuit again 
considered, in Montes v. Vail Clinic, Inc., whether a workplace English-
only policy created a hostile work environment.416  In Montes, the 
defendant hospital adopted an English-only policy that applied to all 
                                                          
 405. See EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1069–70, 1073–76 (N.D. 
Tex. 2000). 
 406. Id. at 1074. 
 407. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1488–90. 
 408. Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1304–06 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 409. Id. at 1306. 
 410. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998). 
 411. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1304–05. 
 412. Id. at 1305. 
 413. Id. 
 414. Id. at 1304. 
 415. Id. at 1306–07; see also EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 
1070 (N.D. Tex. 2000). 
 416. Montes v. Vail Clinic, Inc., 497 F.3d 1160, 1168–72 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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communications in the hospital’s operating room department.417  Several 
Hispanic housekeepers sued the hospital alleging the policy intentionally 
created a hostile work environment.418  The Tenth Circuit held that the 
plaintiff failed to demonstrate an objectively hostile work environment 
because the English-only policy did not apply outside the operating room 
department and was consistent with business necessities.419  Taken 
together, Maldonado and Montes suggest that the existence of a prima 
facie hostile work environment hinges, in part, on the business reasons 
for the English-only policy.420  Thus, as a practical matter, a hostile work 
environment claim will generally fail under both disparate treatment 
theory and disparate impact theory if the workplace English-only policy 
is narrowly-tailored to, consistent with, and motivated by business 
necessities. 
Recent court decisions generally acknowledge—like the EEOC 
guidelines—that overly-broad English-only policies may create a hostile 
work environment.421  At the same time, court decisions also reflect a 
tendency to allow employers to utilize narrowly-tailored English-only 
policies consistent with legitimate business necessities.422  Though no 
circuit has (and few courts have) expressly adopted the EEOC’s 
presumption, some courts accept the EEOC guidelines as evidence that 
reasonable jurors may find that workplace English-only policies create a 
hostile work environment.423  In sum, recent cases suggest a plaintiff 
cannot establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim by merely 
presenting evidence of a limited English-only policy.  Rather, plaintiffs 
may establish a prima facie hostile work environment case by presenting 
objective evidence that the English-only policy had significant, adverse  
 
                                                          
 417. Id. at 1171. 
 418. Id. at 1170 n.15. 
 419. Id. at 1171–72. 
 420. Id.; Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1304 (stating that the lack of an apparent justification for a 
workplace English-only policy makes an inference of a prima facie hostile work environment 
reasonable). 
 421. See, e.g., Montes, 497 F.3d at 1170 n.15; Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1304; EEOC v. Premier 
Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1076 (N.D. Tex. 2000); EEOC v. Synchro-Start Prods., 
Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
 422. See, e.g., Montes, 497 F.3d at 1171–72 (holding that limited English-only rule did not 
create a hostile work environment, in part, because the policy was justified by business necessity); 
Barber v. Lovelace Sandia Health Sys., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1316 (D.N.M. 2005) (affirming 
summary judgment for employer on employees’ English-only disparate impact claim, in part, 
because the employer proffered a legitimate business reason for the policy); Long v. First Union 
Corp., 894 F. Supp. 933, 941 (E.D. Va. 1995) (rejecting plaintiff’s disparate impact English-only 
claim because the policy was justified by business necessity). 
 423. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1306. 
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effects on employees of non-English speaking national origins, which 
may include consideration of the business reasons for the policy. 
D. Section 1981: Intentional Discrimination 
Claims that English-only policies are intentionally discriminatory in 
violation of § 1981 typically fail for the same reasons as analogous Title 
VII disparate treatment claims.  Section 1981 prohibits both public and 
private employers from using English-only policies as a pretext for racial 
discrimination.424  Under § 1981: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the 
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, 
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all 
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is 
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, 
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no 
other.425 
Though § 1981 does not protect employees from language 
discrimination,426 it does protect employees from intentional racial 
discrimination.427  Because § 1981 protects individuals from intentional 
racial discrimination, it necessarily prohibits employers from using 
English-only policies as a pretext for racial discrimination.428  The same 
burden-shifting framework that applies to Title VII disparate treatment 
claims applies to § 1981 claims—the McDonnell Douglas framework.429  
To establish a prima facie case under § 1981, a plaintiff must prove 
intentional discrimination through direct or circumstantial evidence.430  
Evidence of discriminatory intent may be inferred from the disparate 
impact English-only policies have on racial minorities431 as well as a 
                                                          
 424. 42 U.S.C. § 1982(c) (2000); see also Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 
458 U.S. 375, 388 (1982); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 169 (1976) (holding that § 1981 also 
applies to purely private conduct). 
 425. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). 
 426. Id. 
 427. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1957 (2008) (quoting S. REP. NO. 101-
315, at 6 (1990)). 
 428. See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (“Congress intended to 
protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional 
discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.”). 
 429. Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1308 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 430. Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982); see also 
BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW Ch. 11, 365–67 
(3d ed. 1996). 
 431. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1308. 
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history of departures from procedural norms, but the disparate impact 
must be strong, and the correlation precise, to establish the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case.432  If the plaintiff satisfies his or her initial burden, the 
burden shifts to the employer to show that it had a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for the policy.433  If the employer satisfies its 
burden, the plaintiff may then prove that the reason offered by the 
employer was merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination.434 
Unlike a Title VII disparate treatment claim,435 a plaintiff need not 
satisfy the more detailed procedural requirements of Title VII before 
bringing a claim under § 1981.436  Section 1981 therefore has practical 
advantages over Title VII in that (1) it applies to employers with less 
than fifteen employees;437 (2) it allows prevailing plaintiffs to recover 
compensatory and punitive damages without the caps applied to similar 
Title VII damages;438 (3) it has a longer, four-year statute of 
limitations;439 (4) it has no exhaustion of administrative remedies 
requirement;440 and (5) it allows for individual liability, unlike Title 
VII.441  Section 1981 thus provides some plaintiffs with a viable cause of 
action for intentional discrimination that may not be available under Title 
VII.442  Nevertheless, to recover under § 1981, the plaintiff must still 
prove that the challenged English-only policy was merely a pretext for 
intentional race-based discrimination, and thus, most English-only 
plaintiffs will fare the same under § 1981 as under Title VII. 
                                                          
 432. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–68 (1977). 
 433. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 434. Id. at 804. 
 435. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1307; Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 
1987); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 436. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1959 (2008). 
 437. Compare Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 304 n.3 (1994) (“Even in the 
employment context, § 1981’s coverage is broader than Title VII’s, for Title VII applies only to 
employers with 15 or more employees, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), whereas § 1981 has no such 
limitation.”), and Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1975) (“Section 1981 
is not coextensive in its coverage with Title VII.  The latter is made inapplicable to certain 
employers. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).”), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000). 
 438. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000). 
 439. Section 1981 has a four year statute of limitations.  28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) (2000); Jones v. 
R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 380 (2004).  Title VII, in contrast, requires formal 
charges within 180 days of the unlawful employment practice.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). 
 440. Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 441. Compare Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733 (1989) (permitting individual 
liability under § 1981), with Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(denying individual liability under Title VII), and Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 899 (10th Cir. 
1996) (same). 
 442. Donaldson v. Taylor Prods. Div. of Tecumseh Prods. Co., 620 F.2d 155, 158 (7th Cir. 
1980). 
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E. Title VII and § 1981: Retaliation 
The Supreme Court has recently opened the possibility that 
employers could be sued for retaliating against employees who complain 
about discrimination under § 1981,443 even if the court ultimately 
concludes that no unlawful discrimination occurred.444  As discussed in 
section IV, plaintiffs need not exhaust their administrative remedies 
under Title VII to bring a § 1981 claim.445  Thus, plaintiffs like those in 
Maldonado who failed to include retaliation charges in their EEOC 
complaint would not, for that reason, be barred from bringing a 
retaliation suit under § 1981.446  Accordingly, employers may be subject 
to liability for retaliation regardless of whether an employee exhausts his 
or her administrative remedies. 
The Supreme Court has also opened the possibility that employers 
could be sued for retaliating against an individual who helped another 
employee assert his or her § 1981 rights.447  Section 1981 prohibits 
employers from taking retaliatory action against any employee because 
the employee helped another employee secure his or her § 1981 rights.448  
This prohibition against retaliation applies even if the underlying § 1981 
charge lacks merit.449  Accordingly, employers may not take adverse 
action against any employee, regardless of his or her national origin, who 
assists other employees in challenging the employer’s English-only 
policy.  For instance, § 1981 prohibits an employer from retaliating 
against a white employee who tells his Hispanic co-workers that he 
believes that their employer’s English-only policy violates the Hispanic 
co-worker’s § 1981 rights.  Employers should be aware that § 1981’s 
prohibition on retaliation extends not only to employees who directly 
challenge allegedly discriminatory employment practices, but also to 
third parties who help other employees assert their § 1981 rights. 
                                                          
 443. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1954–55 (2008). 
 444. McClain v. N.W. Cmty. Corr. Ctr. Judicial Corr. Bd., 440 F.3d 320, 336 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 445. CBOCS W., Inc., 128 S. Ct. at 1959; Donaldson, 620 F.2d at 158. 
 446. Compare CBOCS W., 128 S. Ct. at 1959, with Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 
1308 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 447. CBOCS W., 128 S. Ct. at 1958–59. 
 448. Id. at 1955. 
 449. Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074 (3d Cir. 1996); Sumner v. U.S. Postal 
Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990). 
07 0_ASSOCIATE EDITOR FINAL 3/8/2009  5:00:43 PM 
2009] WATCH YOUR LANGUAGE! 731 
F. Section 1983 Actions for Denial of First Amendment Rights 
1. Background 
Section 1983 provides employees with a private cause of action 
against state and local government employers who enact English-only 
policies that violate federally protected rights.450  State employers who 
restrict the use of language in the workplace may be faced with employee 
lawsuits alleging that such policies violate employee First Amendment 
rights.451  The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”452  
Although literally applicable only to Congress, the First Amendment also 
prohibits—via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—
other government entities from denying individuals their right to freedom 
of speech.453  State and local employers thus fall within the ambit of the 
First Amendment and may restrict the speech of employees only if the 
restriction satisfies the requirements established by the Supreme Court in 
a line of cases beginning with Pickering v. Board of Education.454 
The Pickering line of cases spawned two different tests to determine 
if a public workplace speech restriction violates the First Amendment—
an ex ante test and an ex post test.  The ex post test—first articulated in 
Pickering and later expanded by Mt. Healthy City School District Board 
of Education v. Doyle455—applies when the government takes an adverse 
employment action against an employee for specific speech after the 
speech took place.456  The ex ante test, in contrast, was first applied in 
United States v. National Treasury Employee’s Union (NTEU)457 and 
applies to speech restrictions that prohibit government employee speech 
before the speech actually occurs.458  Public workplace speech 
restrictions that fail to satisfy either the Mt. Healthy test or the NTEU test 
violate the First Amendment.459 
                                                          
 450. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
 451. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1309. 
 452. U.S. CONST., amend. I, § 2. 
 453. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 454. See generally Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–47 (1983) (discussing Pickering and 
subsequent cases). 
 455. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 456. Id. at 282. 
 457. 513 U.S. 454 (1995). 
 458. Id. at 467–68. 
 459. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 284; NTEU, 513 U.S. at 465–71; Pickering v. Bd. of 
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574–75 (1968). 
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Under the Mt. Healthy test, a court first considers whether the public 
employee’s speech touches on a matter of public concern.460  If the 
speech touches upon a matter of public concern, the court then assesses 
whether the employer’s challenged policy balances (1) the interests of 
the public employee in commenting on matters of public concern with 
(2) the interest of the employer “in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.”461  If such a balance is 
achieved, the employee’s claim may not proceed unless the employee 
establishes that the challenged policy was, in fact, motivated by the 
employee’s exercise of his or her constitutional right.462  Even if the 
employee makes such a showing, the public employer may nevertheless 
defeat the employee’s claim by showing that it would have made the 
same decision absent the employee’s constitutionally-protected 
speech.463 
In contrast to the Mt. Healthy test, the NTEU test applies to ex ante 
speech restrictions—policies that restrict employee speech before it 
occurs.464  To sustain an ex ante speech restriction under the NTEU test, 
“[t]he government must show that the interests of both potential 
audiences and a vast group of present and future employees in a broad 
range of present and future expression are outweighed by that 
expression’s ‘necessary impact on the actual operation’ of the 
Government.”465  The NTEU test applies only the first two factors of the 
Mt. Healthy test because “unlike an adverse action taken in response to 
actual speech, [an ex ante speech restriction] chills potential speech 
before it happens.”466  To account for the greater restriction on 
expression posed by an ex ante restriction, the NTEU test eliminates the 
employee’s final burden, and the employer’s final defense, under the Mt. 
Healthy test. 
Federal law allows state and local government employees to 
challenge English-only policies as violations of the First Amendment.467  
Section 1983 grants a private cause of action to individuals who are 
subjected to a deprivation of their rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by federal law or the Constitution of the United States by a 
                                                          
 460. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145–46 (1983). 
 461. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
 462. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. 
 463. Id. 
 464. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 468. 
 465. Id. 
 466. Id. 
 467. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
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person acting under the color of state or local law.468  The Tenth Circuit 
was the first federal circuit court to consider whether a workplace 
English-only policy, enacted by a unit of state government, violates the 
First Amendment and is therefore actionable under § 1983.469  The 
following section discusses the Tenth Circuit’s holding that a public 
workplace English-only policy does not violate the First Amendment, 
and then goes on to consider why courts may construe this holding 
narrowly. 
2. The Tenth Circuit’s Conclusion that Public Workplace English-Only 
Policies Do Not Violate the First Amendment 
Despite a recent holding to the contrary, English-only policies in the 
public workplace that fail to balance employee and employer interests 
may well violate the First Amendment.  In Maldonado v. City of Altus, 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a § 1983 claim against the 
City of Altus in which Hispanic city employees argued that Altus’s 
English-only policy violated their First Amendment rights.470  In 2002, 
the commissioner of Altus’s Street Maintenance Department enacted an 
English-only policy for employees of the department in response to 
complaints from non-Spanish speaking employees.471  Following the 
enactment of the English-only policy, an employee wrote a letter to the 
city’s director of human resources to complain about the policy and serve 
the city with a discrimination complaint in accordance with policy 
procedures.472  Despite receiving the letter and the complaint, Altus’s 
director of human resources extended the English-only policy to cover all 
city employees.473  The new city-wide English-only policy restricted 
work-time employee communications to English, but made an exception 
for situations where “necessary or prudent to communicate with a 
citizen . . . in his or her native language due to the person or entity’s 
limited English language skills.”474  The English-only policy also 
excepted private communications between co-workers while on break 
and private communications between an employee and a family  
 
                                                          
 468. Id. 
 469. Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1302–03 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 470. Id. at 1298, 1302. 
 471. Id. at 1298. 
 472. Id. at 1299. 
 473. Id. at 1299–1300. 
 474. Id. at 1299. 
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member,475 although some evidence suggested that the English-only 
policy extended beyond its written terms.476 
Hispanic city employees subsequently filed suit against the city 
under § 1983 alleging that the English-only policy denied Hispanic city 
employees their First Amendment rights.477  The district court granted 
summary judgment to the city on the employees’ § 1983 claim.478  The 
Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the employees’ § 1983 claim did not 
satisfy the first and third prongs of the Mt. Healthy test, and therefore, 
the employees’ First Amendment rights were not violated.479  The Tenth 
Circuit reasoned that the English-only policy did not touch on a matter of 
public concern because the proscribed speech consisted of “mundane, 
quotidian conversation” unrelated to an expression of ethnic pride or an 
ongoing debate about race relations.480  The court further noted that had 
the plaintiffs intended to use the Spanish language to “emphasize a point 
or otherwise communicate a message on a matter of public concern, this 
would be a different case.”481  The Tenth Circuit similarly concluded that 
the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the third prong of the Mt. Healthy test 
because they did not show that the city intended to silence speech on 
matters of public concern by enacting the English-only policy.482 
Judge Seymour responded to the Tenth Circuit’s holding with a 
vigorous, well-reasoned dissent declaring that the city’s English-only 
policy constituted an ex ante speech restriction that must be analyzed 
under the NTEU test—not under the Mt. Healthy test applied by the 
majority.483  Since delivering the opinion, the vast majority of 
commentators have agreed with the dissent, and few, if any, 
commentators have argued that the Tenth Circuit applied the correct First 
Amendment test in dismissing the Hispanic employees’ § 1983 claim.484  
Accordingly, state and local employers and employees should not rely on 
                                                          
 475. Id. 
 476. Id. at 1300. 
 477. Id. at 1301–02. 
 478. Id. at 1302. 
 479. Id. at 1313–14. 
 480. Id. at 1310–12. 
 481. Id. at 1312. 
 482. Id. at 1313. 
 483. Id. at 1316–17 (Seymour, J., dissenting). 
 484. See, e.g., Leah Bhimani, Note, The Tenth Circuit Determines that Speaking Spanish is Not 
an Issue of Public Concern and Misapplies the Mt. Healthy Test to a Prior Restraint Claim, 60 SMU 
L. REV. 275, 279–81 (2007); Barbara T. Hung, Comment, Tenth Circuit Decides an English-Only 
Policy Enacted by a Government Employer Does Not Violate Free Speech of Public Employees—
Maldonado v. City of Altus, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 797, 803 (2007); Jessica Wood, Note, 
Maldonado v. City of Altus: Forbidden Languages and an Examination of English-Only Legislation 
and Its Relation to the First Amendment, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 617, 636–37 (2007). 
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the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Maldonado to conclude that limited 
English-only policies will not violate the First Amendment rights of state 
or local employees because the test the Tenth Circuit used to reach its 
holding was likely incorrect. 
The flaw in the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning stems from its failure to 
recognize that the Mt. Healthy test should be applied only to retaliatory, 
ex post speech restrictions—never to ex ante speech restrictions.485  
Instead, the court should have applied the NTEU test to the English-only 
policy because it constitutes an ex ante speech restriction.486  The NTEU 
test recognizes that applying the third and fourth prongs of the Mt. 
Healthy test to an ex ante speech restriction is illogical and contravenes 
the rule that ex ante speech restrictions, because of their chilling effect, 
are subject to heightened scrutiny.  The Tenth Circuit implicitly 
recognized the error in its logic stating that “[h]ow to translate [the third 
prong of the Mt. Healthy test] to the context of an ex ante prohibition, as 
opposed to imposition of an ex post sanction, is not obvious.”487  
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit continued its analysis of the employees’ 
claims under the Mt. Healthy test, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to 
show that the employer’s English-only policy was motivated by an intent 
to silence protected speech.488  As commentators correctly point out, the 
circuit courts uniformly apply the Mt. Healthy test to retaliatory, ex post 
speech restrictions—not to ex ante restrictions.489  Recognizing this, the 
Tenth Circuit previously stated that retaliation is a precondition to the 
application of the Mt. Healthy test.490 
Another matter limiting the precedential value of Maldonado is the 
Tenth Circuit’s analysis of whether speaking Spanish at work constitutes 
a matter of public concern.  The public concern is a particularly 
amorphous concept.491  The language used by public employees at work 
may well constitute a matter of public concern depending on how 
broadly or narrowly one frames the public concern.  Outside the 
                                                          
 485. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1316 (Seymour, J., dissenting); Bhimani, supra note 484, at 275. 
 486. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1317 (Seymour, J., dissenting). 
 487. Id. at 1313 (majority opinion). 
 488. Id. at 1313–14. 
 489. Bhimani, supra note 484, at 280. 
 490. Belcher v. City of McAlester, 324 F.3d 1203, 1207 n.4 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 491. Counterintuitively, a government employee need not address his or her speech to the 
general public to speak on a matter of public concern.  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148–49 
(1983).  In fact, a public employee can speak on a matter of public concern although the employee 
never seeks to inform the public with his or her speech.  Id. at 148.  Courts judge whether speech is a 
matter of public concern by its “content, form, [and] context.”  Id. at 147.  Consequently, whether 
speech constitutes a matter of public concern requires a relatively unstructured case-by-case 
analysis. 
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workplace, considerable disagreement exists as to whether foreign 
language use constitutes a matter of public concern.492  Several cases 
suggest that language choice implicates the public concern because of its 
cultural importance.493  The Tenth Circuit determined that the mere act of 
speaking Spanish was not a matter of public concern but conceded that 
communications of broader public importance—such as speech relevant 
to evaluating the conduct of government—may well constitute speech on 
a matter of public concern.494  Consequently, the context-specific 
NTEU/Mt. Healthy balancing test may well determine the 
constitutionality of other public workplace English-only policies. 
In sum, the Tenth Circuit may have erred in applying the Mt. Healthy 
test to an ex ante speech restriction and in characterizing employee 
language use as a matter of private concern.  If the Tenth Circuit did, in 
fact, err in applying the Mt. Healthy test to an ex ante speech restriction, 
then the more plaintiff-friendly NTEU test will likely apply.  If the NTEU 
test applies to future challenges, the Tenth Circuit’s public concern 
analysis in Maldonado remains relevant.  Future judicial decisions, 
however, may well distinguish the public concern analysis in Maldonado 
if the proscribed non-English communications extend beyond “mundane, 
quotidian conversation” to issues of broader public importance—such as 
speech relevant to the evaluation of government or speech 
communicating ethnic pride.495  Public employers should therefore 
exercise caution in adopting English-only policies because such policies 
may run afoul of the First Amendment under the context-specific 
NTEU/Mt. Healthy balancing test.  Ultimately, the precedential value of 
Maldonado is limited, and the constitutionality of public workplace 
English-only policies will likely turn on the facts of each case. 
3. Considerations for Public Employees and Employers 
The constitutionality of a public workplace English-only policy 
hinges on the answers to two questions.496  First, does the English-only 
policy restrict speech on a matter of public concern?497  Second, does the 
                                                          
 492. Today, thirty states have adopted “Official-English” statutes.  See supra Part II.C.  Perhaps 
adoption of these statutes suggests that workplace language use constitutes a matter of public 
concern. 
 493. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1319 (Seymour, J., dissenting) (citing Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 
998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991)). 
 494. Id. at 1311–12. 
 495. Id. at 1312. 
 496. Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1318 (Seymour, J., dissenting). 
 497. Id. 
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English-only policy balance the public employer’s interest in running an 
effective and efficient workplace with the employee’s interest in 
speaking Spanish?498  Regardless of whether an English-only policy 
restricts speech on matters of public concern, an English-only policy that 
successfully balances the First Amendment rights of employees with the 
employer’s interest in promoting an effective and efficient workplace 
will be deemed constitutional under the NTEU test.499  Accordingly, 
public employers should refrain from enacting English-only policies 
unless the policies are narrowly tailored and justified by legitimate 
business necessities; it is these types of policies that are more likely to 
balance the interests of employees and employers.  Likewise, public 
employees should not accept overly-broad English-only policies which 
have no connection to running an effective and efficient workplace. 
G. Conclusion 
Ultimately, the legality of workplace English-only policies is highly 
context specific.  To avoid costly litigation, employers should thoroughly 
consider the costs and benefits of enacting an English-only policy.  As a 
general rule, employers should (1) adopt English-only policies only when 
supported by legitimate business necessities; (2) tailor English-only 
policies as narrowly as possible to legitimate business necessities; (3) 
thoroughly document the business necessities supporting the adoption of 
an English-only policy; (4) give employees notice of the policy; (5) give 
serious consideration to employee questions and concerns regarding the 
English-only policy; and (6) inform employees that isolated, accidental 
violations of the policy will not result in adverse employment action. 
 
                                                          
 498. Id. 
 499. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
